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Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test 
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Steven C. Seeger 
"[N]o liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the 
free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious 
liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause . . . . "1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 19932 (the "RFRA," 
or the "Act") attempts to renew our national commitment to the 
free exercise of religion. Beginning with the adoption of the com­
pelling state interest test in 1963,3 the Supreme Court defended reli­
gious freedom by strictly scrutinizing any government policy that 
burdened a religious practice. The Court curtailed the protection 
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause, however, in the 1990 
landmark case of Employment Division, Department of Human Re­
sources of Oregon v. Smith. 4 Under the Court's new standard of 
review, the First Amendment no longer protects religious practices 
that conflict with a " 'valid and neutral law of general 
applicability.' "5 
The Smith decision sparked a remarkable public outcry.6 An 
ecumenical coalition of religious and secular organizations voiced 
1. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). The 
First Amendment to the Constitution provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. 
amend. I. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to address 
the constitutionality of the RFRA. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), 
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). As this Note went to press, the Court's decision in Flores 
was still pending. 
3. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07. Under the compelling state interest test, the govern­
ment must justify a law that burdens a religious practice by demonstrating that it furthers a 
compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by a less restrictive means. See 374 U.S. at 
406-407. 
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
5. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). In the Court's view, excusing a religious individual from generally applicable 
laws allows him to " 'become a law unto himself,' " Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds 
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)), which "contradicts both constitutional tradition 
and common sense," Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. Our society would be "courting anarchy,'' the 
Court observed, if the legal system continued to accommodate such religious exemptions. 
See 494 U.S. at 888. In short, the Court held that accommodating religious objections to 
generally applicable laws is a "luxury" that "we cannot afford." 494 U.S. at 888. 
6. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
1472 
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immediate opposition to the Court's new approach.7 With over­
whelming bipartisan support,8 Congress responded by reinstating 
the compelling state interest test through the RFRA.9 
Despite this effort to restore religious freedom, the Act has not 
fully achieved its remedial goals due to narrow judicial interpreta­
tions of the substantial burden requirement.10 Tue statute requires 
a claimant to establish that the government "substantially bur-
Cong. 64 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2797] (statement of Nadine Strossen, Presi­
dent, American Civil Liberties Union) ("I do not recall such sustained and vigorous and 
vitriolic criticism of a Supreme Court's decision in a constitutional law area by lower courts 
. . . . Likewise, in terms of constitutional law professors, religious organizations, public inter­
est organizations, this decision has deserved and received an unprecedented degree of criti­
cism for departing so dramatically from traditional constitutional principles."). For a 
compilation of more than 50 articles criticizing Smith, see The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: Hearings on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 60-62 (1992) 
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 2969] (provided by Oliver S. Thomas, on behalf of the Baptist 
Joint Committee and the American Jewish Committee). 
7. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Sub­
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 
17 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5377] (statement of Rep. Solarz) (noting that the 
broad coalition in support of the RFRA was " 'ecumenical' in both the political and religious 
sense of that term"); see also 139 CoNG. REc. S14,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of 
Sen. Bradley) ("It is a testament to the importance of RFRA that virtually every religious 
group, spanning the entire spectrum, has voiced its support for this bill. It is a rare thing 
when such a diverse coalition joins in wholehearted agreement."); 139 CONG. REc. S14,351 
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting examples of groups that sup­
ported the bill, including the National Association of Evangelicals, the Baptist Joint Commit­
tee on Public Affairs, the American Civil Liberties Union, Concerned Women for America, 
People for the American Way, the American Jewish Committee, and the U.S. Catholic 
Conference). 
8. See Hearings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Rep. Solarz) ("It is per­
haps not too hyperbolic to suggest that in the history of the Republic, there has rarely been a 
bill which more closely approximates motherhood and apple pie than the legislation now 
before you. In fact, I know, at least so far, of no one who opposes the legislation."). 
9. The avowed purpose of the statute is "to restore the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994) (parallel citations omitted). Congress recog­
nized the value of religious freedom in the first line of the statute, finding that "the framers 
of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its 
protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(l) (1994). 
Congress found that "governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without 
compelling justification," and repudiated Smith for "virtually eliminat[ing] the requirement 
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward 
religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3)-(4) (1994). 
10. Perhaps courts fear the institutional consequences of accommodating the exercise of 
religion. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise 
of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) ("Behind every free exercise claim is a spec­
tral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an 
endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe."); see also Note, 
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 
1259 (1989) ("The sheer number of different and unusual religions in the United States has 
traditionally prompted judicial fears that an expansive reading of the free exercise clause 
might paralyze government."). 
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den[ed]" her exercise of religion.11 Once a claimant ·Satisfies this 
requirement, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate 
that the policy furthers a "compelling state interest" that cannot be 
achieved by a less restrictive means.12 
The emerging RFRA case law has yielded three different inter­
pretations of the substantial burden requirement. One approach, 
the "centrality test," requires a claimant to establish that the prac­
tice in question is "central" to her religious beliefs.13 A related 
standard, the "compulsion test," limits the RFRA to practices that 
are religiously compelled.14 Under this test, a claimant must 
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l{a) {1994) ("Government shall not substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section."). 
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994) ("Government may substantially burden a per­
son's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person 
- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental( interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."). 
13. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits apply the centrality test. See Abdur-Rahman v. Michi­
gan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no substantial burden 
because the practice was not "essential" or "fundamental" to the claimant's religion); Werner 
v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) ("To exceed the 'substantial burden' thresh­
old, government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that 
manifests some central tenet of a prisoner's individual beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a 
prisoner's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner reasonable 
opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a prisoner's religion." 
(citations omitted)); Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that the 
Werner approach equally applies to nonprisoners); see also Hall v. Griego, 896 F. Supp. 1043, 
1047 (D. Colo. 1995); United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D. Or. 1995). 
The Eighth Circuit also appears to have adopted the centrality test. See Christians v. 
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). The court ex­
pressly repudiated the compulsion test, protecting tithing even though it was not required by 
the claimants' religion. See Christians, 82 F.3d at 1418. The Court favorably quoted the 
Tenth Circuit test, however, which requires a demonstration of centrality, and assumed for 
purposes of analysis that courts can constitutionally determine "what beliefs are important or 
fundamental, and whether a particular practice is of only minimal religious significance." 82 
F.3d at 1418. 
14. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits apply the compulsion test. See Goodall v. Stafford 
County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no substantial burden because 
the claimants "have neither been compelled to engage in conduct proscribed by their reli­
gious beliefs, nor have they been forced to abstain from any action which their religion man­
dates that they take"); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Davidson 
v. Davis, No. 92 Ctv. 4040(SWK), 1995 WL 60732, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995); Morris v. 
Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995). 
Although the centrality test and the compulsion test are theoretically distinct, courts fre­
quently blur them together to form a hybrid standard. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits 
fall into this category. See, e.g., Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (refer­
ring both to centrality and compulsion); Hicks v. Gamer, 69 F.3d 22, 26 n.22 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(same); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) ("In order to show a free exercise 
violation using the 'substantial burden' test, 'the religious adherent . . .  has the obligation to 
prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion . • •  
by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which 
the faith mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must 
be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.' " 
(alterations in original) (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987)); see 
also Crosley-El v. Berge, 896 F. Supp. 885, 887 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 
93-CV-3747, 1995 WL 364339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995); Weir v. Nix, 890 F. Supp. 769, 
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demonstrate that the government infringes upon a practice that is 
mandated by her faith, or that the government requires the claim­
ant to engage in conduct that is prohibited by her religion. A third 
approach, the "religious motivation test," interprets the provision 
more broadly: a claimant satisfies this standard by demonstrating 
that the government infringes upon a practice that is motivated by 
sincere religious belief. is 
This Note argues that the religious motivation test best secures 
the religious liberty guaranteed by the Constitution and the RFRA. 
Part I examines the text and legislative history of the Act and estab­
lishes that Congress intended to protect religiously motivated prac­
tices. Part II argues that the free exercise case law prior to Smith, 
to which the RFRA explicitly appeals, did not require litigants to 
prove centrality or compulsion. Part III demonstrates that the reli­
gious motivation test protects the full spectrum of religious prac­
tices and religious groups, unlike the centrality test and the 
compulsion test. Part IV illustrates that the motivation test, unlike 
competing approaches, does not require courts to make judgments 
that exceed the bounds of their capacity and their· authority. This 
Note concludes that a claimant who demonstrates a government in­
fringement of a religiously motivated practice satisfies the substan­
tial burden requirement of the RFRA. 
l. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THROUGH TEXT AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
This Part examines the text and legislative history of the RFRA, 
and concludes that Congress intended to protect practices that are 
783 (S.D. Iowa 1995); Tinsley v. San Francisco, No. C 95-0667 EFL, 1995 WL 302445, at *l 
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 1995). 
15. See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1443-44 (W.D. Wis. 1995) petition for 
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1996) (No. 96-710); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 
215, 217-18 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Thus, a 
plaintiffs burden under RFRA is satisfied by a showing that the government has placed a 
substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief."). 
The Second Circuit's explanation of the substantial burden requirement makes no men­
tion of centrality or compulsion, and would appear to encompass religiously motivated prac­
tices. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476-77 {2d Cir. 1996) ("Our scrutiny extends only to 
whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and whether the belief is religious in 
nature . • . .  [A] substantial burden exists where the state 'put[s] substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' "  (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981))). 
The Seventh Circuit interprets the RFRA to cover religiously motivated practices, but 
adopts a test that also reflects vestiges of centrality. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 
(7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, within the meaning 
of the Act, is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated 
conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a per­
son's religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs."); 
see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996) (protecting the "religiously 
motivated" decision to wear a crucifix while in prison, even though wearing such jewelry was 
not "required" by the claimant's religion). 
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motivated by sincere religious beliefs. Section I.A argues that the 
broad language of the Act manifests an intention to cover all forms 
of religious exercise. Section I.B explores the congressional discus­
sions of the bill, and demonstrates that Congress expected that the 
statute would protect religious practices irrespective of compulsion 
or centrality. 
A. The Plain Meaning of the Provisions 
The text of the RFRA provides a natural point of departure for 
an interpretation of the substantial burden requirement.16 The stat­
ute provides that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability."17 The drafters incorporated only one ex-
16. See Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 830 (1983) ("As with any issue of statu· 
tory construction, we ' "must begin with the language of the statute itself." ' "  (footnote omit· 
ted) (quoting Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (quoting 
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 {1980)))). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994). On its face, the text appears to separate a "substan­
tial burden" from a claimant's "exercise of religion." Hence, one would expect that courts 
would engage in two distinct inquiries: first, whether the government policy constituted a 
substantial burden; and second, whether the claimant's activity constituted an exercise of 
religion. In other words, a claimant might fail to present a prima facie case, either because 
the government action did not sufficiently impair the claimant's religious activity, or because 
the claimant's practice did not amount to an exercise of religion under the Act. 
Courts that impose a third requirement-demonstrating centrality or compulsion-do so 
under the substantial burden prong of the Act. Under the centrality and compulsion tests, 
courts find that a claimant has not suffered a "substantial burden" unless the government 
action is sufficiently invasive, and unless the religious practice in question is central or com­
pelled, respectively. See, e.g., Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("In 
weighing whether a particular regulation constitutes a substantial burden, other circuits have 
looked both to the degree of burden placed on an individual and the centrality of the particu­
lar practice burdened . . . .  ") . 
Such courts create unnecessary confusion by linking "substantial burden" with notions of 
centrality and compulsion. Rather than concluding that claimants do not suffer a substantial 
burden if the practice is noncentral or noncompulsory, it would seem more natural, and more 
consistent with the statutory text, for such courts to conclude that noncentral and noncom­
pulsory practices do not amount to an "exercise of religion" under the Act. Put another way, 
if the statute only protects central or compelled practices, as certain courts maintain, then it 
would appear sensible to conclude that noncentral and noncompelled practices do not consti­
tute an "exercise of religion" covered by the RFRA, as opposed to concluding that the gov­
ernment policy does not impose a substantial burden. 
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose that a local government passed a gener­
ally applicable ordinance that forbade the creation of new homeless shelters in a downtown 
area. Claimant A, for sake of argument, views caring for the homeless as a central part of her 
religion; Claimant B considers the same activity to be motivated by his religion, but does not 
believe that such conduct is central to his faith. Under the centrality test, the government 
policy might constitute a substantial burden with respect to Claimant A, but not as to Claim­
ant B, because the latter individual does not claim a burden upon a central religious practice. 
A court might reach this result in spite of the fact that the same government policy - the 
prohibition of new shelters - equally applies to each of the two believers. Rather than 
holding that the government policy is burdensome with respect to Claimant A, but not as to 
Claimant B, it would appear more direct for such courts to conclude that the burden upon 
each claimant is equal, but that the noncentral religious practice of Claimant B is not an 
"exercise of religion" under the RFRA. 
March 1997] Note - Restoring Rights to Rites 1477 
ception to this blanket rule: the state may substantially burden an 
exercise of religion only if the policy or program furthers a "com­
pelling governmental interest" and is the "least restrictive means" 
of furthering that interest.18 Thus, if a claimant establishes a sub­
stantial burden upon her religious practice, the government must 
satisfy the compelling state interest test, or else the statute entitles 
the claimant to "appropriate relief. "19 
The words of the statute inform the present debate in two im­
portant respects. First, the RFRA extends to the full range of reli­
gious conduct that received protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause in the pre-Smith era. Congress ensured that the RFRA 
would apply to the same spectrum of religious conduct by defining 
"exercise of religion"20 by reference to the Free Exercise Clause: 
"exercise of religion" means "the exercise of religion under the 
First Amendment to the Constitution."21 This definition reveals 
that the RFRA protects religiously motivated practices to the ex­
tent that such conduct received protection under the Constitution 
in the years leading up to Smith. In short, RFRA claimants do not 
need to demonstrate centrality or compulsion if the Court did not 
impose such requirements in the pre-Smith case law.22 
Second, the absence of restrictive language in the texf of the 
RFRA suggests that Congress intended to provide broad protection 
for religion.23 On its face, the text manifests no intention on the 
In short, whether the government imposes a substantial burden should not tum on 
whether the believer views the practice to be central or compelled; it should only tum on the 
level of hardship that the government imposes on the claimant's religious practice. 
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(l)-(2) (1994). 
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (1994). Declaratory and injunctive relief represent the 
most common remedies under the RFRA. 
20. Whether the conduct in question is religious, as opposed to nonreligious, is an issue 
that must be resolved under any of these three interpretations of the RFRA. For a discussion 
of what constitutes a "religion" for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA, see 
James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of "Reli­
gion, " 6 SETON HALL CoNsr. LJ. 23 (1995); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An 
Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 309 (1994); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided 
Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEo. L.J. 1519 (1983); Douglas 
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuES 313 (1996). 
21. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994). 
22. For a discussion of the pre-Smith case law, see infra Part II. 
23. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the religious 
motivation test "is more faithful both to the statutory language and to the approach that the 
courts took before Smith"); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[T]he 
text of RFRA ... protects 'the free exercise of religion.' . . .  [T]his phrase refers to particular 
practices which are religious in nature. Such practices are not limited to those deemed to be 
compulsory by religious doctrine."); Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
("This language in no way suggests that the right to free exercise is limited to exercises judi­
cially deemed central to the plaintiffs religion."); see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Con­
gress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. 
REv. 1, 54 (1994) ("Simple textualism strongly argues against limiting RFRA's protection 
only to religious conduct implicating doctrinal 'commands or prohibitions.' "). 
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part of Congress to cabin the statute to narrow subcategories of 
religious conduct. Tue Act extends to a person's "exercise of reli­
gion," a category of conduct that would appear to encompass all 
religious activities.24 If Congress intended to protect only central or 
compelled practices, the drafters easily could have inserted lan­
guage to reflect this crucial limitation. Yet Congress bypassed the 
opportunity to limit the scope of the Act, choosing rather to employ 
inclusive language that reveals no inherent restrictions. Tue ab­
sence of restrictive language in the statutory text supports the con­
clusion that Congress did not intend to confine the RFRA to 
central or compelled practices.25 
B. Legislative History 
Tue legislative history of the RFRA reveals that Congress ex­
pected the statute to apply to all religiously motivated practices. 
Section I.B.1 demonstrates that Congress specifically rejected the 
compulsion test as an overly restrictive interpretation of the statute. 
Section I.B.2 argues that the examples of impermissible burdens 
discussed during the hearings illustrate that the RFRA does not re­
quire a demonstration of centrality. 
1. The Compulsion Test 
Tue legislative history indicates that a claimant may satisfy her 
burden without demonstrating that the practice is compelled by her 
religion.26 While considering the bill, Congress discussed the com-
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (1994); see also Laycock, supra note 20, at 337 ("[T]he 
text [of the Constitution] affirmatively supports the interpretation of guaranteeing as much 
liberty as possible to holders of all views about religion."); Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, 
and the Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 407, 412 (1996) ("The 'exercise' of religion 
comprises many different but related kinds of religious practice, including: public affirmation 
of religious beliefs; affiliation, based on shared religious beliefs, with a church or other reli­
gious group; worship and study animated by religious beliefs; the proselytizing dissemination 
of religious beliefs or other religious information; and moral choices, or even a whole way of 
life, guided by religious beliefs."). 
25. Moreover, the Court's traditional approach toward remedial statutes weighs in favor 
of the motivation test. A "standard of liberal construction" applies to statutes that confer 
new rights or benefits, in order to effectuate the beneficent goals of Congress. See, e.g., 
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987) (quoting Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)) (construing the Federal Employers' Liability Act); 
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1982) (construing Title VII). This 
principle of statutory construction supports an interpretation of the Act that reaches reli­
giously motivated practices. The RFRA is a classic example of a remedial statute: its specific 
purpose is to increase protection for the exercise of religion by restoring the compelling state 
interest test. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994). Congress recognized that religious free­
dom was in jeopardy, and that legislative action was necessary in order to restore the balance. 
A court can advance the goals of the RFRA and follow this accepted approach to remedial 
statutes by construing the Act to extend to practices that are motivated by religion. 
26. See Berg, supra note 23, at 55 ("Eliminating protection for all claims not rooted in a 
religious 'command or prohibition' would undermine some of the central concerns of the 
Act."); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 145, 150-51 
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pulsion test because of the Act's perceived effect upon abortion 
rights. The House conducted subcommittee hearings on the bill in 
May of 1992, on the eve of the Court's decision in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 27 which reaffirmed the constitutional right to 
an abortion. Reflecting uncertainty over the future o� Roe v. 
Wade,2B prolife members of Congress voiced concern that the 
RFRA could provide a statutory basis for the right to an abortion if 
the Court overturned Roe.29 
Profile members of 'Congress initially expressed reservations 
about the bill because they believed that it would cover religiously 
motivated practices.30 Representative Hyde and others observed 
that the bill would not be limited to compulsory conduct, but would 
extend to practices motivated by religion.31 James Bopp, J r., Gen­
eral Counsel to the National Right to Life Committee, shared the 
reservations of the prolife members, and voiced concern over the 
broad scope of the bill: 
[T]he primary scholarly champions of the bill insist that the RFRA 
must be interpreted as applicable to religious motivation, not just reli­
gious compulsion. . . . Given that the RFRA no where defines the 
phrase "burden a person's exercise of religion" and that it[ ]s schol­
arly proponents call for a "motivated by religion" interpretation, it is 
doubtless that a court called upon to make the decision of whether 
the RFRA reaches religious motivation would find that it does.32 
The possible ramifications of an expansive statute were not lost on 
the prolife community: a law that protected religiously motivated 
conduct might also protect religiously motivated abortions. Profile 
participants thus advocated, without success, an amendment to the 
{1995) ("[B]oth the opponents and proponents of the original bill agreed that the standard is 
simply that religion be the principal motivation for the conduct. . . .  The legislative history is 
clear that the conduct does not have to be compelled by religion."); Douglas Laycock & 
Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 209, 
232 {1994) ("In both the House and Senate hearings, supporters and opponents agreed that 
the bill would protect conduct that was religiously 'motivated.' "). 
27. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a woman's right to an abortion. 
29. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Hyde). Inter­
est in this issue did not fade even after Casey: participants in the Senate hearings also dis­
cussed how the RFRA might affect future restrictions on abortion. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 
2969, supra note 6, at 203-04 (statement of James Bopp, Jr., general counsel, National Right 
to Life Committee, Inc.). 
30. See Robert F. Drinan, S.J. & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & REuomN 531, 536-37 {1993-94) ("[T]he primary focus 
of the critics' concerns regarding the RFRA was abortion-related. Of particular concern was 
whether the bill protected only acts 'compelled' by a religious belief or tqose 'motivated' by 
religious belief."). 
31. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 135-36. 
32. Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 220-21 (statement of James Bopp, Jr.); Hearings 
on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 284-85 (statement of James Bopp, Jr.). 
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bill that would have restricted the RFRA to compelled religious 
practices. 33 
Addressing these concerns about the scope of the bill, Repre­
sentative Solarz, the chief sponsor,34 confirmed that the RFRA 
would protect religiously motivated practices. During the hearings, 
Hyde directly asked whether the statute would cover practices that 
are religiously motivated, or only those that are religiously com­
pelled.35 Solarz responded, "I would be reluctant to limit it to ac­
tions compelled by religion, as distinguished from actions which are 
motivated by a sincere belief."36 
Hoping to keep the legislative history "as clear as possible,"37 
Solarz submitted an explanatory letter to the subcommittee follow­
ing his testimony.38 Solarz revealed that the drafters of the bill in­
tended to avoid two extremes. On the one hand, they did not want 
33. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 285 (statement of James Bopp, Jr.) ("Sup­
porters of the RFRA could, of course, easily resolve this problem by inserting 'compelled by' 
language in the RFRA."); see also Laycock, supra note 26, at 151 ("Congress rejected the 
view that only religious compulsion is protected. In committee hearings, lobbyists offered 
amendments to change to a compulsion standard, but those amendments went nowhere."). 
Opponents of an abortion amendment did not deny that the Act would protect religiously 
motivated practices, but questioned the likelihood that the RFRA would restore the right to 
an abortion if Roe were overturned. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 119 (state­
ment of Rep. Solarz) ("(I]f, in fact, the Supreme Court does rescind or repeal Roe v. Wade, it 
is virtually inconceivable that the very same Court would then tum around and, on free 
exercise grounds, reinstate the right to have an abortion . . . •  "). 
34. Hyde noted that the views of Solarz, the chief sponsor, would be critical when deter­
mining the intent of Congress. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 136 (statement of 
Rep. Hyde). 
35. See id. 
36. Id. (statement of Rep. Solarz). Solarz conceded that the bill protected religiously 
motivated practices, but took issue with Hyde's description of the motivation test. Hyde 
feared that the motivation standard would cover any conduct that was consistent with one's 
faith. See id. at 136 (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("All of this stuff about being compelled is 
really beside the point. It is, someone who says my religion nudges me toward - I think it is 
compatible with my religion to have an abortion. That is motivated. And that is protected by 
your bill."). Solarz laid these fears to rest in his testimony and in his letter to the subcommit· 
tee: the RFRA would not apply to conduct which is merely "consistent" with one's religious 
beliefs. See id. at 128-30, 136 {letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards, 
and statement of Rep. Solarz). The meaning of the motivation test received the attention of 
other witnesses during the hearings. See id. at 372 (statement of Douglas Laycock, professor, 
University of Texas School of Law) ("Now, what would the woman have to show about her 
individual religious beliefs? She has to say that her desire for abortion is compelled by or at 
least motivated by her religion. Now, what does motivated mean? It means because of her 
religion . . . .  Religion has to be the reason for her abortion."); Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 
6, at 42 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, general counsel, Baptist Joint Committee on Public 
Affairs) ("RFRA protects conduct only when religion is the primary cause or reason for the 
conduct. It is not enough that religion contributes to a decision that is made largely for 
secular reasons."); see also Laycock, supra note 26, at 151 ("What comes through in the 
legislative history is that compulsion is not required and motivation is sufficient, but religion 
has to be the dominant or the principal motivation."). 
37. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 128 {letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. 
Solarz to Rep. Edwards). 
38. See id. at 128-30 (Jetter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards). 
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to limit the RFRA to practices that are compelled by religious be­
lief. 39 Confining the legislation to mandatory conduct would "run 
the risk of excluding practices which are generally believed to be 
exercises of religion worthy of protection."40 Solarz offered 
noncompulsory prayer as an example of an "unmistakable exercise 
of religion" that the drafters intended to protect, but which would 
remain unprotected under the compulsion test.41 At the same time, 
the drafters did not want to include conduct that is only "consistent 
with" one's faith.42 Searching for language to capture the middle 
ground between "compelled" and "consistent," Solarz selected the 
word "motivated" in an initial draft of the bill.43 Although the ge­
neric phrase "exercise of religion" eventually became the statutory 
standard,44 one conclusion seems clear: the sponsors of the bill ex-
39. See id.; id. at 129 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards) 
(" '[l]t would be a mistake to tighten the language of the Act by confining it to conduct 
"compelled by" religious belief.' " (quoting letter dated Feb. 21, 1991, from Michael W. Mc­
Connell, professor, University of Chicago Law School, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, dean, Val­
paraiso Law School, and Douglas Laycock, professor, University of Texas School of Law, to 
Reps. Solarz and Henry)). 
40. Id. at 129; see also Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 46 (statement of Oliver S. 
Thomas) ("[A] law that protects only religiously compelled acts would exclude many acts 
that are obviously religious. Most believers seek to do more than the bare minimum that 
God requires. Is prayer compelled? Only on occasion .. . .  Is serving as a minister com­
pelled? Not always. These acts would not be protected by the compulsion test. Clearly, they 
should be protected, and are, by RFRA.''). 
41. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 129 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. 
Solarz to Rep. Edwards). 
42. See id. at 129-30 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards) ("To 
say that the 'exercise of religion' might include acts not necessarily compelled by a sincerely 
held religious belief is not to say that any act merely consistent with, or not proscribed [by] 
one's religion would be an exercise of religion.''). Solarz provided the following example: 
the RFRA would not protect the right to brandish a machine gun if the claimant merely 
asserted that the bearing of arms was compatible with his religious beliefs. Id. at 130 (letter 
dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards). 
43. See id. at 128-29 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards). 
44. Solarz revealed that he included "motivated" in an earlier draft of the bill, but re­
moved the word because it began to generate "more heat than light.'' Id. at 128 (letter dated 
June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards). Viewed in isolation, the removal of "mo­
tivated" from the text of the statute might suggest that the drafters intended to exclude relig­
iously motivated practices from the protection of the RFRA. When considered in the 
context of the remainder of the letter, however, this alteration represents an attempt to avoid 
confusing the judiciary, rather than a limitation on the scope of the statute. 
Solarz remarked that " '[i]t is difficult to capture the idea of the dictates of conscience in 
statutory language.' " Id. at 129 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Ed­
wards) quoting letter from Professor McConnell et al. to Reps. Solarz and Henry. Given that 
the pre-Smith case law was not " 'limited to any particular verbal formula in describing what 
constitutes a religious exercise for First Amendment purposes,' " the drafters decided that it 
would be appropriate to employ a generic standard in the text of the statute. Id. (quoting the 
Congressional Research Service); see also id. at 131 (statement of the Congressional Re­
search Service). Solarz concluded that "the term 'free exercise of religion,' used by the draft­
ers of the First Amendment, most accurately described what I hoped to protect through 
passage of RFRA.'' Id. at 128 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Ed­
wards). Utilizing the broad language of the First Amendment would give courts "enough 
flexibility to protect the exercises of different religions on an equal, case-by-case basis," id. at 
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plicitly rejected the compulsion test because it would provide insuf­
ficient protection for the exercise of religion.4s 
2. The Centrality Test 
Unfortunately, Congress did not reveal its view of the centrality 
test in such transparent terms. The subcommittee debates did not 
address directly whether the bill would protect only the central 
practices of one's faith. Representative Solarz provided the closest 
thing to a statement on this issue, expressing the expectation that 
courts would not dissect religious doctrine when deciding cases 
under the RFRA: "Even the independent judiciary has been care­
ful to inquire only into the nature and sincerity of an individual's 
religious belief on a case-by-case basis, avoiding broader inquiries 
into a particular denomination's doctrine, or the nature of religion 
generally."46 Apart from this general observation, the record does 
not include an express instruction on the issue of centrality. 
Courts are not left without direction, however, when construing 
the RFRA. For instance, one might infer from congressional dis­
cussions of the compulsion test that the Act does not require a dem­
onstration of centrality. Statements indicating that the RFRA 
would protect religiously motivated conduct naturally support the 
conclusion that Congress intended to protect all practices within 
this classification. In other words, it would be curious for Congress 
to state that the proposed statute would protect religiously moti­
vated practices if Congress simultaneously intended to limit the 
statute to religiously motivated practices that are also "central." In 
the absence of a statement to the contrary,47 it appears that Con-
129, and would provide a "useful framework for application of the Act" by employing a term 
"sufficiently familiar to the courts," id. at 130. In short, the drafters did not believe that 
Congress could "do any better than the Framers of the Bill of Rights when they chose to 
protect the 'free exercise of religion' and leave its definition to the independent judiciary on a 
case-by-case basis." Id. 
Thus understood, the drafters removed "motivated" in order to avoid confusion: courts 
might misconstrue a departure from the language of the First Amendment as a signal that the 
statute extends to a different range of religious conduct. By incorporating the familiar lan­
guage of the Constitution, the drafters communicated that the statute covers the religious 
activities that received protection under the First Amendment in the years preceding Smith. 
Although the text of the RFRA does not specifically use the word "motivated," religiously 
motivated practices receive protection under the RFRA to the same extent that such prac­
tices enjoyed protection in the pre-Smith case law. 
This conclusion seems all the more reasonable when one considers that the letter repudi­
ates the compulsion test, which would deny protection to religiously motivated practices, in 
no uncertain terms. See sources cited supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
45. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 128-30 (letter dated June 22, 1992, from 
Rep. Solarz to Rep. Edwards). 
46. Id. at 130 (statement of Rep. Solarz). 
47. The record reveals no intention to limit the scope of the Act to practices that are 
central to the adherent's faith. 
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gress intended to protect all practices that are motivated by reli­
gion, irrespective of centrality or compulsion. 
In addition, one can glean guidance from the examples provided 
during the congressional discussions of the bill. Advocates demon­
strated the need for the RFRA by appealing to concrete examples 
- instances when the government had infringed upon the right to 
the free exercise of religion.48 Members offered examples with the 
express expectation that the RFRA would provide a remedy in such 
situations.49 By providing these examples, supporters of the bill re­
vealed their assumptions that the Act would extend to the religious 
practices under discussion: the RFRA could "make a difference" in 
a given case only if the state imposed a cognizable burden upon a 
practice covered by the Act. An examination of these examples 
thus yields a sense of the types of practices Congress intended to 
protect under the RFRA. 
The examples indicate that Congress did not intend to limit the 
Act to central religious practices. Supporters of the bill highlighted 
the need for corrective legislation by citing dozens of actual and 
potential violations of religious liberty.50 Nadine Strossen of the 
American Civil Liberties Union provided a typical litany of prac­
tices that remained vulnerable without the RFRA: 
In the aftermath of the Smith decision ... [a]t risk were such fa­
miliar practices as the sacramental use of wine, kosher slaughter, the 
sanctity of the confessional, religious preferences in church hiring, es­
tablishing places of worship in areas zoned for other use, permitting 
religiously sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or con­
traception services, sex segregation during worship services, exemp­
tions from mandatory retirement[ ] la ws, a church's refusal to ordain 
women or homosexuals, exemptions from landmark and zoning regu­
lations, and the inapplicability of highly intrusive educational rules to 
parochial schools.st 
48. Cf. Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas) ("Since 
Smith was decided, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over religious 
conviction."). 
49. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 18 (statement of Rep. Solarz); id. at 70 
(statement of the Anti-Defamation League); id. at 361-71 (statement of Prof. Laycock); see 
also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 229. 
50. Professor Laycock offered pages of cases decided after Smith in order to illustrate the 
need for remedial legislation. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 361-71; see also 
Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 50-58 (containing a summary of post-Smith cases com­
piled by J. Brent Walker). 
51. Hearings on S. 2969, supra note 6, at 192 (statement of Nadine Strossen); see also 
Hearings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) ("Without the 
restoration of the 'compelling interest' standard, all religious activity is at risk. Government 
employees could be forced to work on religious holidays like Yorn Kippur; Catholic children 
could be prevented from taking wine for communion because they are under the legal drink­
ing age; individuals could be denied the right to pray for healing; Moslems, whose religion 
mandates ritual slaughter, could be unable to obtain religiously sanctioned food; people, in 
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Supporters of the bill offered many other prominent examples: 
forcing the Amish to display bright orange reflectors on their bug­
gies,52 interfering with worship by landmarking the interior of a 
church,53 and shutting down a religious homeless shelter for failure 
to install an elevator to the second floor.54 
When considering these examples, one is struck both by the 
wide range of conduct and by the sheer number of practices that 
Congress intended to protect. On their face, the examples appear 
to represent ordinary instances of religiously motivated conduct. 
The record provides no indication that these practices would be 
considered central, nor that they must be considered central in or­
der to receive protection.55 Given the broad spectrum of religious 
practices discussed in the hearings, and the absence of any indica­
tion that these practices were or needed to be considered central, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that Congress did not foresee a cen­
trality requirement for the RFRA. Through these examples, Con­
gress expressed a quiet but distinct expectation that the RFRA 
would offer broad protection for religious practices regardless of 
their centrality to the individual believer. 
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CASE LAW 
Cases construing the Free Exercise Clause also provide valuable 
instruction to courts that interpret the RFRA. In the decades pre­
ceding Smith, the Court applied the compelling state interest test 
when claimants established a burden upon the practice of their reli­
gion. Smith introduced a new era of free exercise jurisprudence, 
abandoning the strict scrutiny test in cases challenging generally ap­
plicable laws that are facially neutral toward religion. The RFRA 
represents a bold attempt to return to the status quo ante. The Act 
aims to "restore" religious freedom by reintroducing the compelling 
state interest test when individuals challenge governmental action 
that burdens religious conduct. Congress explicitly recognized the 
jurisprudential roots of the statute, and expected that courts would 
look to prior case law for guidance when construing the Act.56 As a 
fact, could be prevented from reading religious literature in public places. This list could go 
on and on. Clearly, every American's personal freedom is at stake."). 
S2. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 18 (statement of Robert P. Dugan, Jr., 
director, office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals). 
S3. See id. at 122 (statement of Rep. Solarz). 
S4. See id. at 149 (statement of Dean Gaffney). 
SS. See Laycock, supra note 26, at 1S2 ("What emerges from these examples is that reli­
gious exercise is substantially burdened if religious institutions or religiously motivated con­
duct is burdened, penalized, or discouraged." (emphasis added)). 
S6. Congress expressly invoked the prior case law in the text of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994) ("[T]he term 'exercise of religion' means 
the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution."). The committee 
reports likewise revealed a clear intention to subject the statute to the approach developed in 
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consequence, the pre-Smith case law plays a major role when inter­
preting the requirements of the RFRA. 
The pre-Smith case law reveals that the Court has never re­
stricted the Free Exercise Clause to central or compelled practices. 
Since the introduction of the strict scrutiny test, the Court has ad­
dressed an array of religious practices brought by believers of di­
verse faiths. Although the Court has found a cognizable burden in 
a number of cases, the Court has not resorted to any single formula­
tion of words to describe a religious practice burdened by the gov­
ernment. 57 Instead, the opinions repeatedly draw attention to the 
religious nature of the conduct, and characterize the underlying 
religious activities in broad and inclusive terms. The cases thus fo­
cus upon government interference with the exercise of religious 
scruples, without dissecting claimants' religious beliefs to determine 
if the practice is central or compelled. 
To be sure, some cases observe that the religious practice in 
question was central to the beliefs of the claimant, while other cases 
mention the mandatory nature of the religious conduct. Yet, the 
fact remains that the Court has never required that the claimant 
establish either centrality or compulsion in order to receive protec­
tion under the First Amendment.58 On the contrary, the opinions 
indicate that a claimant may satisfy her burden by demonstrating 
the cases preceding Smith. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) ("The committee expects that 
the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining 
whether the exercise of religion has been substantially burdened . . . .  "); H.R. REP. No. 103-
88, at 6-7 (1993) ("It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look to free exercise 
of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or not religious 
exercise has been burdened . . . .  "). The reports also indicated, however, that the RFRA 
must not be construed as a Congressional sanction of any prior case in particular. See S. REP. 
No. 103-111, at 9 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7 (1993). 
57. See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of 
Legislative Power, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 247, 271 (1994). 
58. As for "compulsion," Representative Solarz asked the Congressional Research Ser­
vice to determine "whether the exercise of religion has been deemed by the Court to be 
limited to actions that are compelled by religious beliefs or has been more inclusive." Hear­
ings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 131 (statement of the Congressional Research Service). 
The Service responded: "The cases indicate that the Court, although frequently finding the 
religious practice in question to have been compelled or commanded by religious belief, has 
not been limited to any particular verbal formula in describing what constitutes a religious 
exercise for First Amendment purposes." Id. Further, Professor Tribe has argued that the 
Court has never required a demonstration of centrality. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI­
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1247 (2d ed. 1988) ("The magnitude of the religious 
burdens is often stated in terms of the centrality of the tenet to the believer's faith; however, 
'centrality' only partially describes the courts' inquiry. True, centrality does help explain 
some holdings, and the Supreme Court in Sherbert and especially in Yoder emphasized the 
centrality of the burdened beliefs. However, the Court has never specifically required free 
exercise claimants to demonstrate that the state requirement burden a central tenet of their 
beliefs." (citations omitted)); see also Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215, 219 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
("Supreme Court case law before Smith, to which RFRA specifically directs courts to look 
for guidance . . .  did not present a single formulation as to the types of practices covered by 
the Free Exercise Clause."). 
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that the government violated the claimant's exercise of religion, 
without regard to centrality or compulsion. 
Section I.A reviews the two cases specifically cited in the 
RFRA; section LB examines the string of unemployment compen­
sation cases, in which the Court repeatedly found cognizable bur­
dens; section I.C discusses the last few cases leading up to Smith, 
which include an express repudiation of the centrality test. 
A. The Foundational Cases 
The two cases cited in the text of the RFRA, Sherbert v. Ver­
ner59 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 60 introduce this discussion of the Free 
Exercise case law. These precedents support the conclusion that 
the First Amendment protects religiously motivated conduct re­
gardless of whether the practice is central or compelled. 
In Sherbert, the Court confronted a denial of government bene­
fits based on a person's religious beliefs. As a member of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Adell Sherbert devoutly observed 
Saturday as the Sabbath Day of her faith.61 When her employer 
changed to a six-day work week, Ms. Sherbert adhered to her reli­
gious principles, and subsequently lost her job. The state adminis­
trative agency denied her request for unemployment compensation 
benefits, finding that she had refused employment opportunities 
"without good cause."62 
In the view of the Court, it was "clear" that the denial of bene­
fits constituted a burden on the free exercise of the claimant's reli­
gion.63 The Court began its explanation with a general statement 
about the Free Exercise Clause: a law imposes a cognizable burden 
" '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of 
one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between reli­
gions.' "64 Turning to the particular experience of Adell Sherbert, 
the Court cast the burden in terms of a Robson's choice: "The rul­
ing forces her to choose between following the precepts of her reli­
gion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one 
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other 
hand."65 The Court concluded that this between-a-rock-and-a­
hard-place scenario constituted a "substantial infringement" of her 
59. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
60. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
61. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. 
62. See 374 U.S. at 401. 
63. See 374 U.S. at 403. 
64. 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)). 
65. 374 U.S. at 404; cf. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he issue 
in this case . . .  is whether a State may put an individual to a choice between his business and 
his religion."). 
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First Amendment rights,66 comparable to a fine on those who wor­
ship on Saturday.67 
The several opinions in this case reflect an inclusive approach 
toward religion, describing Ms. Sherbert's conduct in the broadest 
of terms.68 In the words of the majority, the First Amendment cov­
ers .!;;tcts prompted by religious beliefs or principles."69 The plain­
tiff {�adily satisfied this standard by demonstrating that her refusal 
to work on Saturday sprang from her "conscientious scruples,"70 
and from her "religious convictions respecting the day of rest. "71 
The Court referred broadly to the "precepts of her religion,"72 with­
out suggesting that only certain types of religious practices would 
be eligible for protection. The opinions filed by other Justices 
echoed the majority, describing the exercise of her religion in gen­
eral terms. The concurring opinions observed that Ms. Sherbert's 
refusal to work on Saturdays was "based on the tenets of her reli­
gious faith,"73 and that her "religious scruples" prompted her deci­
sion.74 "The harm," Justice Douglas observed, "is the interference 
66. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
67. See 374 U.S. at 404. 
68. Despite a number of references to the broad protection afforded by the Constitution, 
some courts have interpreted Sherbert narrowly on the basis of two passages in the majority 
opinion. At the outset of the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the prohibition against 
Saturday labor "is a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed." 374 U.S. at 399 n.1. In 
a later passage, the Court observed that the state had penalized the free exercise of the 
claimant's constitutional liberties by conditioning the receipt of benefits upon her willingness 
to violate a "cardinal principle of her religious faith." 374 U.S. at 406. Some courts have 
inferred from these passages that the Free Exercise Clause only protects central religious 
practices. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1, 942 F. Supp. 511, 516 (W.D. 
Okla. 1996); Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
It is noteworthy, however, that no reference to centrality appears when the Court ad­
dressed the crucial inquiry: "[W]hether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden 
on the free exercise of appellant's religion." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. In the primary pas­
sage discussing cognizable burdens, the Court made no reference to the centrality of the 
claimant's religious practice, and provided no indication that the practice could not enjoy 
constitutional protection unless it was central to her religion. See 374 U.S. at 403-04. If the 
Court intended to restrict the Free Exercise Clause to central religious practices, one would 
expect that the Court would communicate this restriction in its discussion of cognizable bur­
dens. The absence of any reference to centrality in this passage casts doubt upon the conclu­
sion that the Court in Sherbert restricted the Free Exercise Clause to central religious 
practices. 
Viewed in this context, the two aforementioned references to the claimant's religion are 
best understood in descriptive terms: The Court observed that the state burdened a funda­
mental religious practice, but did not intend to establish centrality as a constitutional 
requirement. 
69. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. The implication from this passage is that the First Amend­
ment protects conduct "prompted" by religious belief, unless the state can establish a com­
pelling interest in regulation. 
70. See 374 U.S. at 399. 
71. 374 U.S. at 410. 
72. See 374 U.S. at 404. 
73. 374 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
74. See 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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with the individual's scruples or conscience . . . .  "75 The dissenters 
also recognized that the Court's holding affected "those whose be­
havior is religiously motivated," including Adell Sherbert.76 These 
open-ended references to the plaintiff's religious conduct suggest 
that the Constitution affords broad protection to practices that are 
motivated by sincere religious beliefs. 
The other seminal case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 71 provides further 
guidance about the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. Yoder ad­
dressed a compulsory school-attendance statute that required all 
Wisconsin children to go to school until the age of sixteen.1s As 
members of the Old Order Amish community, the Yoder family 
objected to formal education beyond the eighth grade on religious 
grounds.79 
The Yoders convincingly demonstrated that the state had in­
fringed upon the exercise of their religious beliefs. The family be­
longed to a conservative Amish community that emphasized 
separation from secular society.so The Yoders established that com­
pliance with the school attendance statute would impose a serious 
barrier to the integration of the children into the Amish commu­
nity.s1 Forcing the children to undergo formalized education be­
yond the eighth grade would also jeopardize the family's standing in 
the community, threaten the survival of the Old Order Amish soci­
ety, and endanger the eternal salvation of the family.82 
Again employing inclusive language, the Court found that the 
family's way of life was "rooted in religious belief."83 The Yoders' 
separatist lifestyle was not a matter of personal preference, the 
Court observed, but rather stemmed from "deep religious convic­
tion."84 In the Court's view, the record abundantly supported the 
claim that additional years of education would be "contrary to the 
Amish religion. "85 
75. 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
76. 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
77. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
78. See 406 U.S. at 207-09. 
79. The school district administrator filed suit when the Yoders refused to send their chil­
dren, ages fourteen and fifteen, to public school. Rejecting the constitutional challenge, the 
county court convicted the parents of violating the statute and imposed a nominal fine. See' 
406 U.S. at 207-08. 
80. See 406 U.S. at 209-10. 
81. See 406 U.S. at 211-12. 
82. See 406 U.S. at 209, 212. 
83. See 406 U.S. at 215. 
84. See 406 U.S. at 216. A "deep" religious conviction is not necessarily synonymous with 
a central religious practice. For example, a believer might have a deep religious conviction 
that abortion is wrong, but might picket outside of abortion clinics without viewing such 
activity as a "central" religious practice. 
85. 406 U.S. at 209. 
March 1997] Note - Restoring Rights to Rites 1489 
Admittedly, the Court repeatedly observed that nonconform­
ance with secular society was central to the Yoders' religious be­
liefs. The Court noted that the concept of separation from the 
world was "central to their faith,"86 and that the objection to com­
pulsory education was "firmly grounded in these central religious 
concepts."87 The "fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs" 
would be violated if the state forced Amish parents to surrender 
their teenaged children to formalized education. 88 
Despite these repeated references to the centrality of the con­
duct, several factors suggest that Yoder did not establish centrality 
as an essential element of a Free Exercise claim. First, although the 
Court noted that Wisconsin infringed upon a central religious prac-
. tice, the Court offered no indication that practices needed to be cen­
tral in order to receive protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Standing alone, references to the centrality of the Yoders' beliefs 
fail to establish centrality as a constitutional requirement. Other 
passages in the opinion illustrate the point. For example, the ma­
jority mentioned no less than five times that the compulsory educa­
tion statute threatened the very existence of the Old Order Amish 
community.89 Yet, few people would infer from these passages that 
the Constitution protects individual believers only if the state action 
endangers the future of their religious group. The Court made an 
equal number of references to the fact that the Amish practice of 
separation had persisted for several centuries,90 but it would not be 
sensible to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause applies only to 
religions with such an established heritage. In similar fashion, by 
observing that the state burdened a central religious practice, the 
Court did not thereby restrict the First Amendment to the exercise 
of central religious beliefs. The fact that the state burdened a cen­
tral religious practice in Yoder does not mean that the Free Exercise 
Clause is not implicated when the government burdens other forms 
of religiously motivated conduct. 
Limitations upon constitutional liberties should not be lightly 
assumed. Absent a specific restriction in the text of the provision, 
or an express directive from the Supreme Court, a constitutional 
guarantee ought to apply to the full extent that its words imply. 
The First Amendment protects the "exercise of religion," a cate­
gory of conduct that appears broad on its face. Before one con­
cludes that the Constitution only protects a subcategory of religious 
practices - those that are central - it is appropriate to require 
86. See 406 U.S. at 210. 
87. 406 U.S. at 210. 
88. See 406 U.S. at 218. 
89. See 406 U.S. at 209, 212, 218, 219, 235. 
90. See 406 U.S. at 209-10, 215, 216-17, 219, 235. 
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some definitive statement to that effect from the Court. The hand­
ful of references to the centrality of the Yoders' conduct does not 
rise to the level of clarity one would expect if the Court intended to 
impose such a significant constriction of a First Amendment 
guarantee. 
Second, other passages cast doubt upon the notion that Yoder 
imposed a centrality requirement. At the outset of the opinion, the 
Court implied that the Free Exercise Clause enjoyed a broad appli­
cation, observing that the Constitution protected "religiously 
based" and "religiously grounded" conduct.91 Moreover, at the end 
of the opinion, the Court summarized the facts that contributed to 
its finding that the Yoders had suffered a cognizable burden.92 A 
reference to centrality is noticeably absent from the Court's recita­
tion of the important elements of the Yoders' case,93 adding support 
to the conclusion that Yoder did not restrict the First Amendment 
to the exercise of central religious beliefs.94 
Third, references to the centrality of the Yoders' religious prac­
tices are consistent with the application of the motivation test. 
Practices that are fundamental to a person's religious beliefs consti­
tute a subset of religiously motivated conduct. By establishing that 
the state had violated a central religious practice, the Yoders 
thereby demonstrated that the government burdened a religiously 
motivated practice. Given that the Court nowhere required a dem­
onstration of centrality, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
Yoders proved more than was necessary when they established that 
their religiously motivated conduct was also central to their 
religion.95 
One can also conclude from the facts of Yoder that a claimant 
may satisfy her burden without demonstrating religious compulsion. 
By their own account, the parents were not, strictly speaking, com­
pelled by their religion to remove their children from formal educa­
tion.96 On the contrary, their objection sprang from a general belief 
91. See 406 U.S. at 220. The Court summarily rejected the state's assertion that the First 
Amendment protects religious beliefs, but not religious conduct. See 406 U.S. at 219-20. 
92. See 406 U.S. at 235-36. 
93. See 406 U.S. at 235-36. 
94. This conclusion seems especially appropriate, considering that no subsequent case 
mentioned centrality to the extent of Yoder. See Berg, supra note 23, at 52 ("Thus, although 
Yoder spent a good deal of time discussing how 'central' the concept of separation from the 
world was to the Amish identity, the Court later backed off from making such judgments. In 
unemployment cases after Sherbert, it simply deferred to the believer's claim about impor­
tance." (citations omitted)). 
95. This conclusion seems reasonable given the Court's statement that the plaintiffs 
presented an unusually compelling claim. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235-36 (observing that the 
plaintiffs made a "convincing showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects 
could make"). 
96. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 466 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he parents in Yoder did not argue that th;ir religion expressly 
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in remaining separate from secular society.97 Because their faith 
did not mandate opposition to the secondary schooling, the success 
of the parents in Yoder exemplifies that claimants may establish a 
cognizable burden without demonstrating religious compulsion. 
B. The Unemployment Compensation Cases 
In the years between Yoder and Smith, the only plaintiffs who 
successfully argued free exercise claims before the Court were 
those who contested the denial of unemployment compensation 
benefits.98 These precedents reveal that the Free Exercise Clause is 
not limited to central or compelled practices. 
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 99 the Court outlined an approach that casts serious doubt 
upon the permissibility of the centrality and compulsion tests. The 
plaintiff, Eddie Thomas, worked in a foundry that produced steel 
for industrial use, but was transferred to a department that manu­
factured parts for military tanks.100 Believing that assisting in the 
production of weapons would violate his religious scruples as a Je­
hovah's Witness, he decided to terminate his employment rather 
than surrender his principles.101 Mr. Thomas ultimately filed suit 
after the state review board denied his application for unemploy­
ment benefits.102 
The Court began with the general observation that the Free Ex­
ercise Clause protects beliefs and practices that are "rooted in reli­
gion. "103 The Court decided this aspect of the case with relative 
ease, finding "clear" support in the record that the plaintiff had quit 
his job "for religious reasons."104 
Having resolved this preliminary issue, the Court reviewed the 
specific lines of inquiry entertained by the state court. The 
proscribed public education beyond the eighth grade; rather, they objected to the law be­
cause 'the values . . .  of the modem secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamen­
tal mode of life mandated by the Amish religion.' " (emphasis and alteration in original) 
(quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217) ); Ira C. Lupu, Of Tzme and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 203 (1995) ("Indeed, Yoder 
itself could not withstand a view so pinched. Although the Old Order Amish parents did 
assert that salvation required a life apart from worldly influence, they were not strictly 
obliged by their faith doctrines to withdraw their children from school at the teenage 
years."). 
97. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. 
98. See Lupu, supra note 96, at 177. 
99. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
100. See 450 U.S. at 710. 
101. See 450 U.S. at 710. 
102. See 450 U.S. at 712. 
103. See 450 U.S. at 713-14. 
104. See 450 U.S. at 716; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (Burger, C.J.) 
(observing that Thomas involved a "religiously motivated resignation"). 
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Supreme Court of Indiana had concluded that the plaintiff's objec­
tion to the new work assignment stemmed from personal considera­
tions, rather than religious convictions.105 In support of its finding, 
the state court closely scrutinized the religious beliefs of Mr. 
Thomas, and even considered the religious views of another be­
liever .106 The Court soundly rejected these inquiries as constitu­
tionally infirm, and in the process revealed three constitutional 
principles that undermine both the centrality test and the compul­
sion test. 
First, the protection of the Free Exercise Clause must not de­
pend upon "a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice 
in question."107 The state court observed that the claimant opposed 
working in a weapons factory, but would not object to providing 
raw products that ultimately might be used for military purposes.1os 
Perceiving an internal inconsistency, the state court concluded that 
Thomas opposed the new assignment for philosophical rather than 
religious reasons.109 Upon review, the Court repudiated this ap­
proach, explaining that the First Amendment protects religious 
practices even if they do not appear "acceptable, logical, consistent, 
or comprehensible to others."110 Even the plaintiff's admission that 
he was "struggling" with his beliefs did not dissuade the Court from 
affording considerable deference to the believer's expression of his 
religious convictions.111 "We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a 
line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unrea­
sonable one."112 
Second, whether a practice qualifies for constitutional protec­
tion is not contingent upon doctrinal conformity with other believ­
ers. The Indiana Supreme Court gave special weight to the 
testimony of another Jehovah's Witness, who stated that working in 
an armaments factory would not violate his religious beliefs.113 The 
fact that a fellow believer did not share the plaintiff's views con­
vinced the state court that he had presented a meritless claim. Re­
jecting this line of inquiry, the Court offered a broader vision of the 
right to religious freedom. At its core, the Free Exercise Clause 
protects individuals who dissent from the majority's interpretation 
of religious doctrine. The disagreement with another believer did 
105. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712-13. 
106. See 450 U.S. at 712-16. 
107. 450 U.S. at 714. 
108. See 450 U.S. at 715. 
109. See 450 U.S. at 714-15. 
110. 450 U.S. at 714. 
111. See 450 U.S. at 715. 
112. 450 U.S. at 715. 
113. See 450 U.S. at 715. 
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not impair the plaintiff's claim, the Court found, b�cause "the guar­
antee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by 
all of the members of a religious sect."114 
Third, courts must decide free exercise claims without immers­
ing themselves in the middle of theological disputes. The Court ac­
knowledged that "[i]ntrafaith differences . . .  are not uncommon 
among followers of a particular creed."115 Refusing to assume the 
role of an ecclesiastical referee, .the Court candidly recognized that 
"the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differ­
ences in relation to the Religion Clauses."116 In the words of the 
Court, "[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial compe­
tence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more 
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts 
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."117 
These three principles strongly suggest that applying either the 
centrality test or the compulsion test would contravene the require­
ments of the Constitution. As will be developed in Part IV, both 
tests entail intrusive inquiries into the claimant's religious beliefs. 
Courts cannot remain faithful to the three commands of Thomas -
showing deference to the individual believer, protecting doctrinal 
diversity, and avoiding theological disputes - if they condition the 
guarantee of religious freedom upon a demonstration that the prac­
tice was central to or compelled by the claimant's religious 
beliefs.118 
114. 450 U.S. at 715-16. 
115. 450 U.S. at 715. 
116. 450 U.S. at 715. 
117. 450 U.S. at 716. 
118. An oft-quoted passage does not support a conclusion to the contrary. Discussing the 
burden on Mr. Thomas, the Court stated: 
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a 
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by reli­
gious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. 
450 U.S. at 717-18. Despite this reference to mandatory and prohibited conduct, this state­
ment should not be understood to support the compulsion test, for two reasons. First, there 
is little reason to believe that the Court intended to exhaust the range of cognizable burdens 
in this passage. By stating that a burden may exist if the government infringes upon compul­
sory conduct, the Court did not thereby imply that a religious practice must be compulsory in 
order to receive protection. Indeed, it would appear arbitrary to suggest that government 
conduct constitutes a burden when the believer considers the practice to be compulsory, but 
that identical state action would not amount to a burden if the believer views the religious 
practice to be noncompulsory. Second, the middle of this passage reveals the true focus of 
the Court: a cognizable burden exists when the government places "substantial pressure on 
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." 450 U.S. at 718 (emphasis 
added}. The underlying concern, it appears, is to limit governmental encroachment upon 
religious conduct. As such, the adverse treatment of the claimant, rather than her theological 
views, determines whether the state has imposed a substantial burden upon the exercise of 
religion. 
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Building upon Thomas, the Court extended the protection of 
the Free Exercise Clause to recent converts in Hobbie v. Unemploy­
ment Appeals Commission of Florida.119 After joining the Seventh­
day Adventist Church, Paula Hobbie informed her employer that 
she would no longer be able to work on the Sabbath, a decision that 
ultimately resulted in her dismissal. The state subsequently refused 
her request for unemployment benefits, finding that she had been 
discharged for "misconduct connected with [her] work. "120 Echo­
ing Sherbert and Thomas, the Court found that the subsequent de­
nial of unemployment benefits imposed a cognizable burden, 
because it forced her "to choose between fidelity to religious belief 
and continued employment. "121 The fact that the plaintiff had re­
cently converted to the faith did not dissuade the Court from pro­
tecting her "religiously motivated choice."122 
Addressing yet another denial of unemployment benefits in Fra­
zee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,123 the Court re­
inforced the notion that the First Amendment protects individual 
believers, irrespective of whether they share the beliefs of any par­
ticular religious group. As an avowed Christian, William Frazee 
professed an opposition to working on Sunday. The state denied 
his request for unemployment benefits, however, because he was 
not a member of any particular church or denomination. Upon re­
view, the Court repeated that the individual right to the free exer­
cise of religion does not depend upon allegiance to the doctrine of a 
broader religious community. As the Court explained, an in­
dependent believer may invoke the protection of the First Amend­
ment without reference to the views of other believers: "[W]e 
reject the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise 
Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular 
religious organization. Here, Frazee's refusal was based on a sin­
cerely held religious belief. Under our cases, he was entitled to in-
119. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
120. 480 U.S. at 139 (alteration in original). 
121. 480 U.S. at 144. Once again, the Court referred to the exercise of religion in general 
tenns, without suggesting that the First Amendment only protects central or compelled prac­
tices. See also 480 U.S. at 137 (referring broadly to the claimant's "sincerely held religious 
convictions"). 
122. See 480 U.S. at 142 n.7; 480 U.S. at 148 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court's opin­
ion in Hobbie also suggests that a demonstration of centrality is not required under the Con­
stitution. At the outset of the opinion, the Court noted that Ms. Robbie's "conversion was 
bona fide and that her religious belief is sincerely held." 480 U.S. at 138 n.2. Unlike Sherbert 
and Yoder, however, the Hobbie opinion makes no reference to the centrality of the claim­
ant's religious practice - the opinion provides no indication that this particular claimant 
viewed the observance of the Sabbath as a central practice of her religion. The absence of 
any reference to centrality in Hobbie suggests that the Free Exercise Clause is not restricted 
to central religious practices. 
123. 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
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voke First Amendment protection."124 In short, the Free Exercise 
Clause protects individual believers without requiring conf onnance 
to the doctrine of a larger religious community. As will be elabo­
rated in Part IV, the centrality and compulsion tests undermine the 
holding in Frazee, often requiring claimants to establish centrality 
or compulsion by reference to the views of other members of the 
faith. 
C. Repudiating the Centrality Test 
Beginning with Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association, 125 the Court issued a series of opinions that explicitly 
repudiated the centrality test as a constitutionally infirm inquiry.126 
Lyng addressed a Forest Service proposal to construct a road in a. 
national forest over land that was sacred to local Native American 
tribes.121 The centrality test entered the fray at the suggestion of 
dissenting Justice Brennan. Seeking to balance the competing in­
terests, Justice Brennan proposed that the plaintiffs be required to 
124. 489 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added). This passage reveals that an individual suffers a 
cognizable burden when the state infringes upon the exercise of a "sincerely held religious 
belief." This general statement supports the conclusion that the First Amendment protects 
religious practices, irrespective of whether the claimant believes that they are central or 
compelled. 
125. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
126. In other contexts, the Court has significantly restricted the scope of cognizable bur­
dens. In institutional settings, such as prisons and the military, believers will encounter 
greater difficulty establishing a substantial burden upon their free exercise rights. See 
O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). A 
claimant may also Jack a prima facie claim if she cannot establish a violation of a specific 
religious belief, or if she challenges the internal workings of the government. See Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693 (1986). The Court imposed these limitations, however, without reference to whether the 
practices were central to or compelled by the claimants' religious beliefs. 
During the legislative hearings for the RFRA, one advocate suggested that the Free Exer­
cise Clause only protects religiously mandated practices, on the basis of the Court's holding 
in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See S. 2969, supra note 6, at 239 (statement of James 
Bopp, Jr.). Harris addressed a free exercise challenge to the Hyde Amendment, which lim­
ited the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse the cost of abortions. The Court held that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the free exercise challenge, because "none [of the indigent 
pregnant women] alleged, much less proved, that she sought an abortion under compulsion 
of religious belief." 448 U.S. at 320. Despite this passing reference to "compulsion," the 
Court found that the plaintiffs Jacked standing, not because their religious beliefs did not 
mandate abortions, but because the women did not allege an infringement of their religious 
beliefs at all. The plaintiffs, in fact, brought the free exercise challenge because "a woman's 
decision to seek a medically necessary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs 
under certain Protestant and Jewish tenets." 448 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added). Thus under­
stood, Harris does not require a demonstration of compulsion, but merely stands for the 
rather unexceptional proposition that litigants lack standing to raise a free exercise challenge 
on their own behalf if they do not allege that the government burdened the exercise of their 
personal religious beliefs. 
127. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442. 
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demonstrate that the land-use decision adversely affected sites that 
were "central" to the practice of their religion.128 
The majority responded by rejecting the centrality test in no un­
certain terms. As the Court explained, unless courts automatically 
accept a claimant's assertion of centrality, this standard places 
courts in the position of deciding whether the claimant is correct in 
professing that a practice is central to her religion.129 If a court 
holds that the practice is not in fact central, in spite of the claim­
ant's statement to the contrary, the court would implicitly decide 
that the claimant misunderstands the principles of her own religious 
faith.130 The majority concluded that "such an approach cannot be 
squared with the Constitution or with our precedents," and would 
"cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play."131 
The Court returned to the issue of centrality in Hernandez v. 
Commissioner.132 Addressing a free exercise challenge to the dis­
allowance of a tax deduction, the Court began with a broad state­
ment that appeared to open the door to inquiries into centrality.133 
The Court immediately explained, however, that courts must not 
undertake judicial expeditions into religious territory. "It is not 
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs 
or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpre­
tations of those creeds."134 
128. See 485 U.S. at 473-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
129. See 485 U.S. at 457. 
130. See 485 U.S. at 457-58. 
131. 485 U.S. at 458. This rationale for rejecting the centrality test would seem to apply 
to the compulsion test with equal force. There is little reason to believe that courts are capa­
ble of discerning whether a practice is compelled, given their inability to detennine whether a 
practice is central. Both tests place courts in the untenable position of second-guessing the 
avowed religious beliefs of a devout litigant. 
132. 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
133. See 490 U.S. at 699 ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed 
a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice . • . .  "). 
134. 490 U.S. at 699. Given that this passage specifically rejected inquiries into centrality, 
it is curious that the preceding sentence in the opinion cast the free exercise inquiry in tenns 
of a burden upon a "central religious belief or practice." Perhaps the Court meant that prac­
tices must be central in order to be protected, but courts cannot second guess an assertion 
that the centrality requirement has been satisfied. In other words, one might interpret this 
passage to create a subjective centrality requirement - the claimant must believe that the 
practice is central in order to receive protection, but the court cannot dispute the avowed 
centrality of the practice. 
This interpretation of Hernandez seems unlikely - in practical tenns, it would amount to 
a requirement that the plaintiff plead centrality, and nothing more. It also seems doubtful 
that the Court would establish such a requirement with a passing reference in an introductory 
sentence, without offering any rationale, and without acknowledging the clear repudiation of 
centrality inquiries in Lyng. Moreover, given that the text of the First Amendment broadly 
protects the "exercise of religion," there is little reason to restrict this constitutional guaran­
tee to the central practices of one's faith. Practices that are not central to one's religion are 
no less deserving< of constitutional protection. This conclusion seems all the more sound 
when one considers other rights protected by the First Amendment. It would be unthinkable 
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Although a construction of the RFRA must tum upon the pre­
Smith case law, it is noteworthy that the Court once again expressed 
disapproval of the centrality test in the Smith135 decision. Building 
a case against the compelling state interest test, the Court ad­
dressed the contention that the test should apply only when the 
state burdens a central religious practice.136 The majority explained 
that the judiciary is institutionally incapable of deciding the role of 
a particular practice within a claimant's religion: 
What principle of la w or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a 
believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his personal 
f aith ? Judg ing the centrality of di fferent religious practices is akin to 
the unacceptable "business of evaluating the relative merits of di ffer­
ing religious claims ." . . .  Repeatedly and in many di fferent contexts , 
we have warned that courts must not pres ume to determine the place 
of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious 
claim.137 
to suggest, for example, that the Free Speech Clause protects only the "central" statements of 
a speaker, or that the Free Press Clause extends only to the "central" practices of the media. 
A more plausible explanation is that the Court referred to a burden upon a central prac­
tice in descriptive, rather than prescriptive, terms. The Court probably intended to make the 
observation that believers are more likely to challenge government conduct if it encroaches 
upon practices that are central to their religion, even though the practices need not be central 
to merit protection under the Constitution. 
135. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
136. See 494 U.S. at 886. 
137. 494 U.S. at 887-88 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 
263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)); see also 494 U.S. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment) ("I agree with the Court [that] '[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.' " (citation omitted) (quoting Her­
nandez, 490 U.S. at ·699)); 494 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I agree with Justice 
O'Connor that courts should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a matter of 
religious doctrine, a particular practice is 'central' to the religion.''); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. 
Supp. 215, 220 (1995) (observing that the Court in Smith "unanimously rejected a centrality 
inquiry on the basis of judicial competence"). 
The text of Smith sharply criticized the centrality test, but footnote four contained the 
bulk of the Court's larger point. The majority attempted to use the established failure of the 
centrality test as another reason for dispensing with the compelling state interest standard 
when claimants challenge generally applicable laws. After the text reaffirmed the pre-Smith 
repudiation of the centrality test, footnote four introduced an entirely new proposition: 
courts cannot apply the compelling state interest test without inquiring into the centrality of 
the religious practice. In the Court's words, dispensing with considerations of centrality 
would be "utterly unworkable," because "both the importance of the law at issue and the 
centrality of the practice at issue must reasonably be considered" if claimants are able to 
challenge generally applicable laws on free exercise grounds. 494 U.S. at 888 n.4 (emphasis 
omitted). A '"[c]onstitutionally significant burden,"' Justice Scalia believed, "would seem to 
be 'centrality' under another name." 494 U.S. at 887-88 n.4. Without the burden of establish­
ing centrality, Justice Scalia feared that claimants would demand protection for Lilliputian 
concerns, thus giving "the practice of throwing rice at church weddings" the same status as 
"the practice of getting married in church." 494 U.S. at 888 n.4. To summarize the Court's 
argument, because the compelling state interest standard requires a judicial determination of 
the centrality of a religious practice, and because courts are institutionally incapable of evalu­
ating centrality, the compelling state interest test must be an inappropriate standard for free 
exercise claims. 
When addressing the Court's argument, it is essential to recall that the RFRA rejects the 
Smith approach in favor of the Sherbert line of cases. Congress envisioned that courts would 
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As the Court explained, it is inappropriate for courts to evaluate 
the "centrality" of a practice when deciding a free exercise claim, 
just as it is improper for courts to decide the "importance" of ideas 
in free speech cases.13s 
In her concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor made 
clear what has been at least implicit in the preceding series of free 
exercise cases. No less than one dozen times, Justice O'Connor 
made reference to the fact that the Constitution protects practices 
that are "motivated" by religion.139 These passages quietly attest to 
a principle that now seems clear: the First Amendment protects 
practices that are motivated by religious beliefs, irrespective of 
whether the believer views them to be central or compelled. 
III. THE INCLUSIVE SCOPE OF THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION 
TEST 
This Part focuses on the scope of each of the three tests, and 
argues that the motivation test offers the appropriate breadth of 
protection for religious-based conduct. Section I.A demonstrates 
that the centrality test and the compulsion test exclude religious 
practices that warrant protection under the RFRA. Section I.B 
contends that these two standards also categorically exclude certain 
religious groups, whose practices cannot be understood in terms of 
centrality or compulsion. 
A. The Exclusion of Certain Religious Practices 
As their names reveal, the three competing interpretations of 
the RFRA do not protect an identical range of religious conduct. 
The religious motivation test encompasses all practices that are 
principally motivated by sincere religious beliefs. In contrast, the 
centrality test confines the statute to the fundamental aspects of 
one's faith, and the compulsion test limits the Act to practices that 
are either mandated or prohibited by one's religious beliefs. By 
construe the Act according to pre-Smith case law, and thus Smith can contribute to a con­
struction of the Act only to the extent that it confonns with the preceding free exercise 
jurisprudence. When the text of Smith repeated the earlier renunciation of the centrality test, 
the Court plainly echoed its prior holdings, therefore, this passage can infonn a construction 
of the Act. When footnote four claimed that centrality inquiries are inherent in the applica­
tion of the compelling state interest test, however, the Court embraced a novel proposition 
that found no support in the preceding case law. As a result, this material departure from the 
Court's free exercise heritage ought not be considered by those who construe the RFRA. 
At another level, there is little reason to accept the premise that application of the com­
pelling state interest test entails a consideration of centrality. Whether the government im­
poses a cognizable burden can and should be determined by the degree of governmental 
interference with religious conduct and not by the theological views of the individual 
claimant. 
138. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87. 
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failing to include the entire spectrum of religious conduct, the cen­
trality and compulsion tests leave vulnerable a significant number 
of religious practices, and thereby frustrate the broad remedial 
goals of the RFRA. 
The compulsion test offers insufficient protection for the exer­
cise of religion because it misperceives the nature of religious expe­
rience. At its core, the compulsion test assumes that the exercise of 
religion amounts to nothing more than obedience to a set of com­
mands and prohibitions. Put another way, the compulsion test rests 
upon a duty-based conception of religion, viewing religious prac­
tices in terms of the "do's" and "don'ts" of one's faith. Although it 
is beyond doubt that some religious practices can be understood in 
such terms, it is equally certain that not all religious conduct in­
cludes the element of compulsion.140 Indeed, believers engage in 
many religious practices that are not strictly compelled by their reli­
gion.141 For example, believers might pray the rosary, contribute 
financially to a place of worship, or care for the poor without feel­
ing strictly compelled to do so.142 Under the compulsion test, the 
state could encroach upon any of these religious practices with im­
punity, because those who engage in such noncompulsory conduct 
would be unable to establish that the government burdened a com­
pulsory religious practice.143 The compulsion test significantly con-
140. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case 
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1373, 
1390 {1981) ("One of the most common errors in free exercise analysis is to try to fit all free 
exercise claims into the conscientious objector category and reject the ones that do not fit. 
Under this approach, every free exercise claim requires an elaborate judicial inquiry into the 
conscience or doctrines of the claimant. If he is not compelled by religion to engage in the 
disputed conduct, he is not entitled to free exercise protection . . . .  This approach reflects a 
rigid, simplistic, and erroneous view of religion."). 
141. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many religious practices 
that clearly are not mandatory . . .  are important to their practitioners, who would consider 
the denial of them a grave curtailment of their religious liberty."); Hearings on H.R. 2797, 
supra note 6, at 322 (statement of Dean Gaffney) {"We do lots of thiµgs in our religious 
exercise that are not compelled."); id. at 370 (statement of Prof. Laycock) ("[A]n amendment 
limiting the bill to conduct that is religiously compelled would impose serious costs on reli­
gious liberty.") (providing four case examples); see also Berg, supra note 23, at 53; Douglas 
Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
841, 847 {1992). 
142. See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782, 803-04 (1992) ("Although a specific religious tenet may not man­
date and define the nature of a pastoral counseling center, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation 
program, or a community's participation in moral dialogue, it surely is the case that these 
forms of religious conduct are rooted firmly in belief and are motivated by broad obligations 
to love and serve the neighbor." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Laycock, supra 
note 140, at 1390 ("Many activities that obviously are exercises of religion are not required 
by conscience or doctrine. Singing in the church choir and saying the Roman Catholic rosary 
are two common examples."). Other examples of religious practices that may not be strictly 
compelled include: building a place of worship, operating a homeless shelter, attending reli­
gious services, and studying at religious educational institutions. 
143. Of course, claimants could present a free exercise challenge to a law if it lacked a 
rational basis, or if it specifically targeted religious activity. See Church of the Lukumi 
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stricts the scope of the statute, leaving many believers without 
recourse if the government interferes with the exercise of their reli­
gious beliefs. This unfortunate consequence of the compulsion test 
is difficult to reconcile with the broad remedial purposes of the 
RFRA.144 
When actually employed in a free exercise case, the underinclu­
sive scope of the compulsion test leads to unacceptable distinctions 
between comparable religious practices. A case decided prior to 
the enactment of the RFRA illustrates the point. In Brandon v. 
Board of Education, 145 a Christian student organization filed suit 
after school officials denied their request to conduct prayer meet­
ings on school premises.146 The Second Circuit found no cognizable 
burden on their exercise of religion, resting its decision upon a du­
bious distinction between voluntary and compulsory prayer. The 
court observed that members of the aptly named "Students for Vol­
untary Prayer" were not required by their religious beliefs to pray 
together before school. Because the prayer session was not strictly 
compelled by their religion, the court concluded that the denial of 
access did not violate the students' right to the free exercise of 
religion.147 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Smith, 494 U.S. 872. The point here 
is simply that the compulsion test forecloses the opportunity to present a RFRA challenge, 
and thus to enjoy the benefit of the compelling state interest test, when the state infringes 
upon noncompulsory practices through neutral laws of general applicability. 
144. Those who urged passage of the RFRA anticipated that the statute would confer 
broad protection for religious freedom. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) ("[T]he 
committee finds that legislation is needed to restore the compelling interest test. As Justice 
O'Connor stated in Smith, '(t]he compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's man­
date of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.' " (em­
phasis added) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment))); H.R. 
REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7 (1993) (same); see also 139 CONG. REC. H8,714 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 
1993) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("[T]oday, we have taken another step to ensure that the 
promise of the first amendment and the protections afforded by the Constitution are avail­
able to all religious believers."); 139 CONG. REC. Sl4,467 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement 
of Sen. Kennedy) ("The Religious Freedom Restoration Act will assure all Americans the 
right to follow the teaching of their faiths, free from Government interference."); 139 CONG. 
REc. Sl4,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bradley) ("[T]his bill breathes new 
life into the protections we give for the free exercise of religion and ensures that • . .  freedom 
of religion will again be restored as a constitutional norm, not an anomaly. This bill ensures 
that religious liberty will once again be given its proper place among our most valued liber­
ties."); 139 CoNG. REc. H2,357 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("Since 
Smith was decided in 1990, individuals seeking to practice their religion, unhampered by 
Government action, have largely been without recourse. The Religious Freedom Restora­
tion Act will provide them with a means to challenge Government regulations which unnec­
essarily burden the free exercise of religion. The legislation will guarantee that all 
Americans, regardless of their particular creed or oath, are able to enjoy the right to worship 
and practice their faith, [free] from unnecessary Government intrusion."). 
145. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980). 
146. See 635 F.2d at 973. 
147. See 635 F.2d at 977. 
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With remarkable candor, the court revealed that the decision 
likely would have been different if the students had been followers 
of Islam. Unlike the plaintiffs' Christian beliefs, the court observed, 
the Muslim faith requires its followers to prostrate themselves "five 
times daily in the direction of Mecca. "148 Without explaining why 
the presence of compulsion was constitutionally significant, the 
court expressed the view that the Constitution would require access 
to school facilities if the claim were brought by Muslim students.149 
The court in Brandon thus illustrates the perils created by the com­
pulsion test. Needless to say, an approach that affords different 
treatment to Christian and Muslim prayer offers insufficient protec­
tion for the exercise of religion.150 
Like the compulsion test, the centrality test excludes religious 
activities that deserve protection under the RFRA. Almost by defi­
nition, only a limited number of religious practices can be funda­
mental to a person's religion. Indeed, for many believers, only a 
moment's reflection is needed to call to mind a number of sincere 
religious practices that are not necessarily "central" to their reli­
gion. For example, for some individuals, singing in a church choir, 
volunteering at a homeless shelter, or supporting a religious charity 
are important religious practices, though they might not view such 
participation - as central to their religion. The centrality test 
removes such practices from the sphere of protection afforded by 
the RFRA, leaving them vulnerable to governmental interference. 
Practices that are not central to a believer's religion are no less 
deserving of protection under the RFRA.151 Noncentral practices 
contribute to the richness of religious experience, complementing 
the fundamental aspects of one's faith in meaningful ways. Such 
practices often serve as an expression of the believer's faith, and 
allow individuals to carry out their beliefs in everyday life. The ex­
clusion of noncentral religious practices deprives believers of the 
right to participate fully in their religious heritage, and thus falls 
148. 635 F.2d at 977. 
149. See 635 F.2d at 977. 
150. The Supreme Court of Washington reached an equally remarkable result in Witters 
v. State Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989) (en bane). The Commission for 
the Blind denied a student financial assistance for vocational training because he sought to 
pursue Biblical studies in preparation for a career as a pastor or missionary. See 771 P.2d at 
1120. The student alleged that the denial of funding due to the religious nature of his studies 
violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court of Washington ap­
plied the "compulsion test" and achieved a counter-intuitive result: because the student's 
religion did not mandate that he become a minister, the denial of funding did not implicate 
his right to freely exercise his religion. See 771 P.2d at 1123. 
151. Just as the Free Speech Clause is not confined to the central parts of a person's 
speech, so also the Free Exercise Clause, and the RFRA, should not be limited to the central 
parts of a person's religion. 
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short of the RFRA's goal to secure religious freedom for individual 
believers.152 
In contrast to these two interpretations, the religious motivation 
test fully protects the "exercise of religion." Even a casual observer 
of religion is undoubtedly aware that believers engage in all sorts of 
religious practices, including those practices that are neither funda­
mental nor mandatory. The motivation test reflects an appreciation 
for this diversity by extending the RFRA to the entire spectrum of 
religious experience. Under this approach, any practice that is prin­
cipally motivated by religion can enjoy the protection of the RFRA. 
Unlike the centrality test and the compulsion test, which limit the 
Act to subsets of religious conduct, the motivation test embraces 
the diversity of religious practices by protecting the full range of 
religious conduct.153 
B. The Exclusion of Certain Religious Groups 
The motivation test also extends the RFRA to all religious 
groups. This approach allows believers of any religion to invoke 
the. RFRA when the government infringes upon their religiously 
motivated practices. In contrast, the centrality test and the compul­
sion test only protect certain forms of religion, leaving vulnerable 
those believers who follow minority faiths. The inability of these 
two tests to cover all religious groups militates strongly in favor of a 
more inclusive approach: the religious motivation test. 
152. See sources cited supra note 144. Moreover, the text of the RFRA reflects an appre­
ciation for the holistic religious experience, broadly protecting the "exercise of religion." 
153. Critics of the motivation test might argue that this approach offers too much protec­
tion for religious practices. Some religious plaintiffs might claim, so the argument goes, that 
most everything they do is "motivated" by religion in a very real sense. If the RFRA covers 
religiously motivated practices, religious individuals might be able to challenge almost every 
governmental action, thus forcing the state to justify its policies under the compelling state 
interest test. 
This objection fails to withstand close analysis. First, the legislative history reveals that 
the motivation test only extends to practices that are principally motivated by religious be­
liefs. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 136 (statement of Rep. Solarz). Even if a 
litigant claimed that every action was motivated by religion at some level, the claimant would 
have to demonstrate that religion provided the principal motivation behind the activity in 
question. As an empirical matter, there are probably few religious individuals who would 
claim that their every action is principally motivated by religion. This intuition is reinforced 
by the RFRA and free exercise case law: litigants have yet to claim that their right to reli­
gious freedom extends to everything they do. Second, even if a litigant did make this bold 
claim, a court would not be forced to accept the individual's assertion without further in­
quiry. On the contrary, the court must determine whether a litigant is sincere in her religious 
objection to a governmental policy. Very few individuals could sincerely claim that religion 
provides the principal motivation for every action in everyday life. Third, even if courts 
encountered a few such claims, brought by sincere individuals, the litigation would hardly be 
able to debilitate the state: the government would have the opportunity to justify its practice 
under the compelling state interest test. Fourth, the Court has previously shown displeasure 
with such slippery-slope objections. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) 
(rejecting the speculative claim that the compelling state interest test will encourage the "fil­
ing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections"). 
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The compulsion test does not extend to all religious groups be­
cause it misconceives the nature of religious faith. As stated above, 
the compulsion test views the practice of religion as obedience to a 
set of sacred commands and prohibitions. This narrow conception 
of religion results in the exclusion of recognized religious groups 
from the refuge of the RFRA. Although some religions instruct 
their followers to obey the commands and prohibitions of the faith, 
other religious groups, especially those outside the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, lack the concept of religious compulsion. Theravada 
Buddhism, for example, is a nonduty-based religion, which empha­
sizes inward spiritual maturity rather than obedience to religious 
mandates.154 Unfortunately, if the state substantially burdened the 
exercise of this religion, the compulsion test would insulate the 
state's action from review under the RFRA, because followers of 
this faith would not be able to demonstrate a burden upon a relig­
iously compelled practice. The compulsion test thus would fore­
close the opportunity to challenge state action under the RFRA 
when the state infringes upon religions that do not compel the con­
duct of their followers. 
The centrality test rests upon a similarly fl.awed view of religion, 
and thus creates a comparable exclusion of certain religious groups. 
By requiring a demonstration of centrality, this test assumes that all 
religions have' practices that are more central than others. Not all 
religions, however, necessarily maintain practices that can be 
termed "central."155 For example, faiths that either embrace all re­
ligions, such as certain New Age religions,156 and groups that sup­
port no unifying creed, such as the Quakers,157 may not be able to 
demonstrate that any particular practice is central to their religious 
beliefs. Individuals who adhere to such religions cannot share in 
154. See NANCY WILSON Ross, BUDDHISM: A WAY OF LIFE AND THOUGIIT 80 (1980) 
("[W]hereas in our Western religious tradition sins and virtues are matters of 'Thou shalt' 
and 'Thou shalt not,' the Theravada Buddhist has no similar commandments. There are in­
stead, counsels of perfection which begin 'It is better to . .  .' or 'It is better not to . .  .' follow 
such and such a course of action. This type of instruction leaves the choice of behavior to the 
individual, who remains free to verify through his own experience the wisdom of these sug­
gestions." (quoted in Berg, supra note 23, at 53 n.228)). 
155. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1249 n.48 ("[T]he very concepts of 'centrality' 
and 'religious burden' may be tied to particular religious traditions. Various forms of Christi­
anity, for example, have clear divisions between secular and religious spheres, while other 
Christian sects, and other religions, perceive themselves as consisting of an integrated way of 
life."). 
156. The Truth of Life Movement and other New Age religious groups fit into this cate­
gory. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS: RELIGIOUS CREEDS 690-92 (J. 
Gordon Melton ed., 1st ed. 1988). 
157. The Quakers, the Unitarians, and the Bahais are generally viewed as noncreedal, 
and thus may lack practices that may be termed "central.'' See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN RELIGIONS: RELIGIOUS CREEDS, supra note 156, at 448-49, 649-50, 788. 
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the religious freedom offered by the RFRA so long as courts con­
tinue to require a demonstration of centrality. 
This categorical exclusion of religious groups is problematic on a 
number of levels. First, excluding particular religions from the pro­
tection of the RFRA betrays the spirit of the ecumenical coalition 
that rallied support for the Act. The RFRA came into existence 
largely through the efforts of the religious community, which united 
in support of the bill notwithstanding their theological differ­
ences.158 Courts cannot remain faithful to the ecumenical origins of 
the RFRA so long as they adopt interpretations of the statute that 
deny certain religious groups an equal share of religious freedom. 
Second, the exclusion of minority religious groups violates a 
central purpose of the RFRA - to prevent the government from 
imposing majoritarian conceptions of religion. As Justice Scalia 
conceded in Smith, leaving accommodation to the political process 
places unpopular religious groups at a "relative disadvantage. "159 
In order to protect minority religious groups, which would remain 
vulnerable if the political process represented their only recourse, 
Congress returned supervisory powers to the judiciary, empowering 
them to strictly scrutinize governmental action that burdens the ex­
ercise of religion.16° Courts that adopt the centrality test or the 
compulsion test, however, unwittingly reintroduce majoritarian reli­
gious perspectives, as evidenced by the exclusion of minority reli­
gious groups. The adoption of these two tests thus undermines a 
central goal of the RFRA - to secure religious freedom for minor­
ity groups who cannot protect themselves through the political 
process.161 
158. See sources cited supra note 7. 
159. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990); see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Religions that have 
fewer members, especially if those members are drawn from the margins of society, do not 
have sufficient influence over the legislative process to avoid being flailed by the dinosaur's 
tail of legislation of general applicability, legislation not motivated by any animus toward 
minor sects but merely insensitive to their interests - possibly even oblivious to their exist­
ence."); Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 104 (statement of Nadine Strossen) ("[I]t is 
precisely the most unpopular religions practiced by the most marginalized and vulnerable 
people in our society where we cannot expect the legislative process to be attentive to their 
beliefs . . . .  It is the minority religions, the unpopular religions, the new religions that are 
going to be discriminated against."). 
160. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 {1943) ("The very 
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them 
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to 
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights 
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."). 
161. See Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 127 (statement of Rep. Solarz) {"If 
religious freedom has any meaning at all, it is that everyone's exercise of religion must be 
protected equally - free from the threat that popular passions will interfere with the en­
forcement of so fundamental a liberty."); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 {1993) {"State and local 
legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to craft exceptions from laws of general application 
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Third, and most importantly, interpreting the Act so as to ex­
clude certain religious groups violates the First Amendment. 
Throughout its history, the Court has repeatedly declared that the 
state may not show favoritism toward any particular religion.162 In­
deed, "[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that 
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an­
other. "163 Both the compulsion test and the centrality test violate 
this prohibition by adopting models of religion that favor certain 
religious groups while entirely excluding others.164 Denying relief 
to individuals, simply because they follow religions without central 
or compelled practices, contravenes the First Amendment's com­
mand to give equal treatment to different religions. 
The religious motivation test, in contrast, avoids these serious 
pitfalls. Under this approach, followers of any religion may invoke 
the RFRA when the government imposes a substantial burden 
upon religiously motivated conduct. Presumably, no religious ad­
herent can claim to be excluded by a standard that protects relig­
iously motivated practices. Unlike competing interpretations, 
which exclude certain religious groups from the outset, the motiva­
tion test allows followers of any religion to utilize the Act when the 
government infringes upon the exercise of religion.165 By extending 
to protect the ability of the religious minorities to practice their faiths, an explicit fundamen­
tal constitutional right . . . . To assure that all Americans are free to follow their faiths free 
from governmental interference, the committee finds that legislation is needed to restore the 
compelling interest test."); see also Hearings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 20 (statement of 
Rep. Solarz); Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 129 (statement of Rep. Solarz); Hear­
ings on H.R. 5377, supra note 7, at 70 (statement of the Anti-Defamation League). 
162. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1968) ("The First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion . . . . [T]he State may not 
adopt programs or practices . . .  which 'aid or oppose' any religion. This prohibition is abso­
lute." (citation omitted) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963))); 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The 
fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government . . .  effect no favoritism 
among sects . . .  and that it work deterrence of no religious belief."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral wlien it comes to cpmpetition be­
tween sects."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (noting that the state cannot 
"prefer one religion over another"); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("The 
First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred 
treatment. It puts them all in that position."). 
163. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also 456 U.S. at 245 ("This constitu­
tional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continu­
ing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause."). 
164. See Lupu, supra note 10, at 958 ("When narrow, ethnocentric models of religion are 
employed by decisionmakers, free exercise adjudication may readily become a vehicle for 
judicial violations of the establishment clause."). 
165. Indeed, if there were a religion without religiously motivated practices, there would 
never be an occasion to bring a claim under the RFRA for a governmental infringement of a 
religious practice. If religions without practices did, in fact, exist, the government would only 
be able to infringe upon their religious beliefs, and such regulation is prohibited per se under 
the First Amendment. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
1506 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1472 
the RFRA to followers of all religions, the motivation test reflects 
an appreciation for the origins of the statute, protects minority 
groups that would remain vulnerable in the political process, and 
remains faithful to the requirements of the Constitution. 
IV. HEEDING JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS 
The religious motivation test recognizes the limitations placed 
upon courts that interpret and apply the RFRA. Under this ap­
proach, courts must decide whether sincere religious beliefs provide 
the principal motivation behind a claimant's course of conduct. Re­
quiring courts to determine a claimant's motivations does not place 
insuperable burdens on the judiciary, and does not encourage 
courts to engage in an inappropriate line of inquiry. 
In contrast, both the centrality test and the compulsion test in­
vite courts to make judgments that are beyond the bounds of their 
capacity and their authority. In two important respects, both tests 
encourage determinations that exceed the limits placed upon the 
judiciary. Section I.A argues that courts lack the ability to discern 
whether a practice is in fact central to or compelled by a claimant's 
religious beliefs. Section LB contends that courts cannot apply 
either test without violating the prohibition against resolving theo­
logical disputes. 
A. The Limits of Judicial Capacit)! 
A primary difficulty with the centrality and compulsion tests is 
that neither standard can be meaningfully administered by the 
courts. Each test assumes that courts are capable of discerning 
whether a practice is either central to or compelled by a claimant's 
religious beliefs. Courts, however, lack the capacity to make such 
judgments, because there is no definitive authority against which to 
measure a claimant's  assertions regarding centrality or 
compulsion.166 
Imagine that a devout individual presented a RFRA claim 
before a court that adopted the centrality test. Unless the court 
accepts the practitioner's own evaluation of the centrality of the 
practice, 167 the court would have to consider extrinsic evidence to 
determine if the practice is, in fact, central to the claimant's reli­
gious beliefs. Similarly, if the court adopted the compulsion test, 
the court would need to consider evidence apart from the believer's 
own views to decide whether her faith compelled the practice in 
166. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of 
Employment Discrimination, 61 B.U. L. REV. 391, 405 {1987) (noting that courts lack "com­
petence to choose between conflicting assertions of the content of religious doctrine"). 
167. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 457 (1988). 
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question. In short, unless courts are willing to defer to a believer's 
judgment regarding centrality or compulsion, they must appeal to 
some external source of authority to determine if a given religious 
practice is in fact central or compelled. 
A fundamental problem arises, however, when courts search for 
a body of authority by which to gauge whether a claimant's reli­
gious practice is central or compelled. Neither religious texts, nor 
religious experts, nor even those in positions of spiritual leadership, 
can disprove· the religious beliefs of an individual believer. ' 
Courts sometimes make the mistake of accepting the testimony 
of other members of the claimant's faith, believing that such indi­
viduals can offer insights about the religious practice in question.16s 
The religious views of other individuals, however, cannot disprove 
that the claimant believes the practice to be central or compelled.169 
The practice of religion, after all, is an intensely personal enter­
prise.170 Individuals invariably form religious views that differ from 
those held by members of the same faith.171 Because individuals 
develop personally tailored religious beliefs, the religious views of 
other believers cannot be used to contest the beliefs of a particular 
claimant. 
Even an appeal to the "mainstream" view of members of the 
claimant's religion misses the essential point. The right to the free 
exercise of religion includes the right to develop viewpoints that 
168. See, e.g., Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 
1995) (finding that Friday services were not "fundamental" to the claimant's religion on the 
basis of a chaplain's testimony about the Islamic religion); Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 93-CV-
3747, 1995 WL 364339, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995) (rejecting a prisoner's objection to 
tuberculosis testing, on the basis of testimony from a Muslim authority). 
169. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1249 ("When a claimant avers that a prohibi­
tion or requirement conflicts with his or her own faith, the appropriate inquiry may begin but 
cannot end by looking to the dogma of a religious tract or organization; the ultimate inquiry 
must look to the claimant's sincerity in stating that the conflict is indeed burdensome for that 
individual"). 
170. See generally Note, supra note 10, at 1266-69. 
171. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In religious matters, we take 
judicial notice of the fact that often the keenest disputes and the most lively intolerance exists 
among persons of the same general religious belief, who, however, are in disagreement as to 
what that faith requires in particular matters."); see also Laycock, supra note 140, at 1391 ("A 
church is a complex and dynamic organization, often including believers with a variety of 
views on important questions of faith, morals, and spirituality . . . .  [T]he officially promul­
gated church doctrine, on which courts too often rely, is not a reliable indication of what the 
faithful believe. At best the officially promulgated doctrine of a large denomination repre­
sents the dominant or most commonly held view; it cannot safely be imputed to every be­
liever or every affiliated congregation." (citation omitted)); Lupu, supra note 10, at 959 
("[T]he individualization of religion in the Court's free exercise decisions renders the concept 
of centrality even less useful; what is central to one observant may be peripheral to others, 
including some or all of the 'experts.' " (citation omitted)); Thomas E. Geyer, Comment, Free 
Exercise Jurisprudence: A Comment on the Heightened Threshold and the Proposal of the 
"Burden Plus" Standard, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 1035, 1043 (1989) ("[A] burden to one believer 
may be trivial to another believer of the same faith."). 
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vary from those of other believers.112 This right to form one's own 
religious beliefs would be circumscribed if courts could consider the 
subjective religious views of other individuals when addressing the 
avowed beliefs of a particular litigant.173 
The Court's candid discussion of judicial limitations in 
Thomas114 supports this conclusion. The lower court gave great 
weight to the testimony of another Jehovah's Witness, who ex­
pressed a view about working in an armaments factory that differed 
from that of the plaintiff PS The Supreme Court soundly rejected 
the notion that courts are allowed to consider the religious views of 
other believers. "Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncom­
mon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process 
is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to 
the Religion Clauses."176 
Besides an appeal to other members of the faith, alternative 
sources of evidence prove to be equally unhelpful. Scrutinizing the 
practice itself would be a fruitless exercise, because it is unclear 
what a "central" or "compelled" practice looks like, especially 
when one considers the religious diversity in our society.177 Reli­
gious texts also provide an improper basis for contesting the views 
172. See Note, supra note 10, at 1268-69 ("A proper respect for the value of individual 
identity underlying the free exercise clause should empower an individual with the right to 
originate religious claims as an expression of moral independence. This power encompasses 
the right to form, express, and revise religious conceptions. Objective determinations of reli­
gious burdens deviate from this vision because they undervalue the claims of atypical individ­
uals - those who feel the weight of government intrusions differently and who adhere to 
certain religious practices more stringently than others. Because religious beliefs are so 
individualistic, free exercise jurisprudence must consider each person's particular conception 
of religious obligations and how they may be fulfilled. Individuals, even among those belong­
ing to the same faith, may attribute varying degrees of sacredness to religious tenets." (cita­
tions omitted)). 
173. See Id. at 1266. 
174. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
175. See 450 U.S. at 715. 
176. 450 U.S. at 715. This conclusion also seems to follow from the holding in Frazee. If 
a person need not be a member of a religious organization to enjoy the benefit of the Free 
Exercise Clause, then it stands to reason that the believer also need not conform to the views 
of other believers to share in the right to religious freedom. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of 
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) ("(W]e reject the notion that to claim the protec­
tion of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular 
religious organization."); see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to 
contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?"); 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986) (addressing the petitioner's unique views regarding 
social security cards without considering the religious beliefs of other members of the 
Abeneki tribe). 
177. Indeed, efforts to establish objective guidelines for what constitutes a "central" or 
"compelled" practice may violate constitutional boundaries. See Lupu, supra note 10, at 959 
("The idea [of centrality] cannot be employed without judicial standards concerning the 
meaning and significance of religious behavior, teachings, and phenomena. Any attempt to 
declare such standards, however, runs the usual and grave risk of bias toward Western, mon­
otheistic religions . . . .  "). 
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of a claimant, given that scripture is susceptible to different inter­
pretations.178 The claimant's history of engaging in the practice is 
also of questionable value, given the possibility of sincere religious 
conversions.179 Indeed, it appears that there is no source of author­
ity by which to determine whether a particular practice is central or 
compelled, apart from the expressed views of the individual claim­
ant. Without an external locus of authority, courts lack the capacity 
to decide whether the practice is, in fact, central or compelled.180 
In contrast, courts are eminently capable of applying the reli­
gious motivation test. This standard requires courts to decide 
whether a practice is motivated by sincere religious beliefs.181 
Courts are routinely called upon to make determinations of motiva­
tion in other areas of law.182 Issues often arise about a party's moti­
vations, and the legal system presumes that courts are able to 
resolve such issues.183 By focusing on an inquiry that is frequently 
178. The sheer number of Christian denominations, for example, attests to the fact that 
followers of a common faith interpret scripture differently. A court cannot reject a RFRA 
claim based upon a passage of scripture, because the individual may accept a different under­
standing of the text, or may even reject the authority of a given passage of scripture entirely. 
In any event, courts lack the authority to interpret religious texts, and cannot require a claim­
ant to accept an "orthodox" interpretation of scripture. For a discussion of Establishment 
Clause concerns, see infra section IV.B. 
179. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comrnn. of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) 
("In effect, the Appeals Commission asks us to single out the religious convert for different, 
less favorable treatment than that given an individual whose adherence to his or her faith 
precedes employment. We decline to do so."). 
180. At a more basic level, even if a court could determine whether the practice was 
central or compelled, religious practices that are not central or compelled are no less deserv­
ing of protection. Such practices form a valuable part of a believer's religious experience, 
and ought to receive protection irrespective of the theological views of the claimant. Inter­
estingly enough, courts that adopt the centrality and compulsion tests fail to offer a rationale 
for leaving such practices vulnerable to state interference. 
181. Granted, deciding whether a particular claimant is "sincere," and resolving whether 
a particular practice is "religious," are problematic inquiries. Such difficulties, however, are 
not unique to the motivation test. Under any of the three competing interpretations of the 
RFRA, courts must decide that the claimant is sincere, and that the conduct in question is, in 
fact, religious in nature. For a discussion of what constitutes a religion under the First 
Amendment and the RFRA, see sources cited supra note 20. For a discussion of the sincerity 
requirement, see TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1248-51. 
182. See, e.g., Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 (1994) (protecting the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence); Smith v. 
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (allowing punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an im­
proper intent motivated the defendant's actions); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (scrutinizing the motivations of policymakers under 
the Equal Protection Clause); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3rd Cir. 1995) 
(observing that the federal in forma pauperis statute requires courts to "engage in a subjec­
tive inquiry into the litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine 
whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant"). 
183. See Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (E.D. Cal. 1996) ("[P]roving a requisite 
motive or mental state is hardly an unknown burden on plaintiffs . . . .  The law frequently 
requires proof of a state of mind, and the fact that such proof is always circumstantial has not 
constituted an insurmountable barrier to conviction for specific intent crimes, or liability for 
malicious conduct. The issue [of religious motivation] is similar and should prove no more 
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raised in other legal disputes, the motivation standard allows courts 
to stay within the bounds of their judicial capacities.184 
B. The Limits of Judicial Authority 
In addition, the centrality test and the compulsion test violate 
the Constitution by requiring courts to resolve theological dis­
putes.185 Courts cannot decide whether a practice is central to or 
compelled by a litigant's religion without making a theological in­
terpretation of the believer's faith. Courts exceed constitutional 
boundaries when they willingly engage in such doctrinal 
decisionmaking. 
The centrality and compulsion tests require courts to make judg­
ments about theological issues, as illustrated by the case of 
Rhinehart v. Gomez.186 The plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, objected 
to a required tuberculosis ("TB") test on religious grounds. After 
the prison officials forcibly administered the test, the plaintiff filed 
suit under the RFRA. 
Applying a hybrid test that considered both centrality and com­
pulsion, the court found no substantial burden on the plaintiff's reli­
gion.187 The court justified its conclusion by appealing to the views 
of other followers of Islam. The court accepted the testimony of a 
local Muslim chaplain, who expressed the opinion that TB testing is 
consistent with the Islamic faith. The court also drew attention to 
the plaintiff's inability to cite Muslim authorities who shared his 
religious beliefs.188 After noting that other courts had approved the 
TB testing of Muslim inmates,189 the court concluded that the pris­
oner had failed to establish that TB testing "substantially bur-
difficult than in those other instances." (construing the substantial burden requirement of the 
RFRA)). 
184. For a brief discussion of how to establish religious motive, see Rouser, 944 F. Supp. 
at 1455 n.14. 
185. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he decisive argument in 
favor of the generous definition of 'substantial burden,' it seems to us, is the undesirability of 
making judges arbiters of religious law, as required by the alternative approach[ es]." (cita· 
tions omitted)). 
186. No. 93-CV-3747, 1995 WL 364339 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995). 
187. See Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339. Even if the Court had found a cognizable burden 
on the claimant's religion, the state might have been able to justify the TB testing under the 
compelling state interest test. 
188. See Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339, at *5. 
189. See Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339, at *5. The fact that other Muslim inmates had ob­
jected to TB tests casts into doubt the court's conclusion that the Muslim faith provides no 
basis for such objections. Again, the subjective religious views of other members of the 
plaintiff's faith ought not to have been considered at all. Yet, it is curious that a court would 
consider external evidence and then overlook the pattern of objections to TB testing brought 
by Muslim prisoners in other cases. 
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den[ ed) his ability to exercise an essential element of his 
religion. "190 
Viewing a "substantial burden" in terms of central beliefs and 
religious compulsion, the court in Rhinehart entered the "thicket of 
theology. "191 Embroiled in the middle of a doctrinal dispute, the 
court threw the power of the state behind one party's interpretation 
of the Islamic faith. In essence, the court endorsed the chaplain's 
view as the "orthodox" Islamic perspective, while repudiating the 
theological convictions of the plaintiff as an aberrant interpretation 
of a common faith. Such theological involvement by a state offi­
cial-an inevitable consequence of both the centrality test and the 
compulsion test-is inconsistent with a long line of cases that for­
bids courts from deciding questions of religious doctrine.192 
Beginning with the seminal case of Watson v. Jones, 193 the Court 
has steadfastly refused to make judgments regarding theological is­
sues. "In this country the full and free right to entertain any reli­
gious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any 
religious doctrine . . .  is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, 
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of 
no sect. "194 
Subsequent cases reinforced the rule that judges may not take 
sides in a theological controversy.195 In short, " [c]ourts are not ar-
190. Rhinehart, 1995 WL 364339, at *5 (emphasis added). 
191. The phrase is from Lupu, supra note 10, at 959. 
192. See id. at 959 ("[A]ny imaginable process for resolving disputes over centrality cre­
ates the spectre of religious experts giving conflicting testimony about the significance of a 
religious practice, with the state's decisionmaker authoritatively choosing among them. A 
hoary and well-respected line of cases . . .  strongly suggests that judicial resolution of theolog­
ical controversy is both beyond judicial competence and out of constitutional bounds."); see 
also TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1244 ("[A]n intrusive government inquiry into the na­
ture of a claimant's beliefs would in itself threaten the values of religious liberty."); Berg, 
supra note 23, at 51-56 ("Unfortunately, it is often difficult for courts to calibrate effects on 
religious practice, because an important part of that calculus - how important is the practice 
to the believer or church? - is essentially a theological question beyond the competence or 
authority of judges . . . .  [T)he 'command or prohibition' limit itself suffers from the same 
defect as did the Court's previous inquiries into the 'centrality' or 'importance' of a practice. 
It improperly requires courts to make 'theological' judgments about whether the particular 
conduct is religiously mandated or just religiously motivated." (citations omitted)); Lupu, 
supra note 166, at 406-07 ("[T)he constitutional evil to be avoided in all cases is judicial 
resolution of questions of religious doctrine and practice . . . .  "). 
193. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
194. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728. Watson involved a dispute over church property. The 
Court !Iatly rejected the invitation to decide which party followed the principles of the Pres­
byterian Church. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29. 
195. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 887 (1990) ("Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unaccept­
able 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.' . . .  Repeatedly 
and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine 
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim." (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))); Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the judicial ken to question the 
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biters of scriptural interpretation."196 Adopting one party's view of 
"centrality" or "compulsion" would violate both the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment: it would 
amount to a state sanction of one set of religious beliefs, and also 
would deprive the losing party of the right to exercise religion with­
out governmental interference.197 "If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion . . . .  "198 
Simply put, judges should not be permitted to dissect religious 
doctrine and determine the theological significance of a claimant's 
exercise of religion. The compulsion test and the centrality test re­
quire courts to transgress this limitation - courts must offer a de­
finitive interpretation of religious doctrine whenever there is a 
dispute about whether a given practice is central or compelled. 
Such unsavory inquiries violate the rights of the individual believers 
and undermine the traditional prohibition against a judicial resolu­
tion of theological disputes. 
In contrast, the religious motivation test allows courts to avoid 
such unpalatable inquiries. This standard requires courts to decide 
whether a practice is principally motivated by religious belief. 
Once a claimant demonstrates religious motivation, the court has 
no opportunity for further inquiries into the role of the practice 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' 
interpretations of those creeds."); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to 
inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands 
of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."); Jones v. Wolf, 
443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) ("Most importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from 
resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice."); Serbian 
E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) 
("[R]eligious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry . . . .  "); Maryland 
and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Bren­
nan, J., concurring) (stating that courts must resolve religious disputes "without the resolu­
tion of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into religious polity"); Presbyterian 
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Meml. Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment forbids courts from deciding "mat­
ters at the very c9re of a religion - the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the 
importance of those doctrines to the religion"); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian 
Orthodox Church in N.A., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (affirming the power of religious bodies 
"to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well 
as those of faith and doctrine"); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(noting that the judiciary is "ill-equipped to examine the breadth and content of an avowed 
religion"). 
196. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. 
197. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.12, at 
1242 (4th ed. 1991) ("[T]he government cannot declare which party is correct in matters of 
religion, for that would violate the principles of both religion clauses. A judicial declaration 
of such matters would simultaneously establish one religious view as correct for the organiza­
tion while inhibiting the free exercise of the opposing belief."). 
198. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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within the claimant's faith. The religious motivation test thus main­
tains :fidelity to the Constitution by avoiding the "treacherous busi­
ness"199 of deciding the place of a religious practice in the lives of 
devout individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
Smith concluded that religious individuals must look to the 
political branches, and not to the Constitution, for protection from 
generally applicable laws that encroach upon religion. The political 
branches, in tum, soundly repudiated Smith and reinstated the 
compelling state interest test through the RFRA. 
With broad remedial designs, Congress intended for the Reli­
gious Freedom Restoration Act to provide a bulwark of protection 
for religious liberty. Many courts, however, have failed to remain 
faithful to the laudable goals of the statute. Narrow interpretations 
of the substantial burden requirement undermine the ultimate pur­
pose of the Act: to secure the inalienable right to the free exercise 
of religion. 
The religious motivation test conforms with the sweeping lan­
guage of the RFRA, with the intent of Congress as revealed in the 
legislative history, and with the directives of the Court in the pre­
Smith case law. The motivation standard protects the exercise of 
religion without excluding any religious practice or religious group. 
This standard shows respect for the limitations placed upon the ju­
diciary, and does not put courts in the position of resolving theolog­
ical disputes. In short, the religious motivation test provides the 
best avenue for enhancing protection for the exercise of religion. 
As Representative Solarz observed during consideration of the 
bill: "It would be tragic if the effort to overturn Smith resulted in 
Congressional inquisitions into, and determinations of, the content 
of religious law, or a narrow statutory definition of what is a 'reli­
gion' or a religious 'exercise.' "20° It would be equally tragic if 
courts continued their inquisitions into religious law by limiting the 
RFRA to central and compelled practices. 
199. See TRIBE, supra note 58, § 14-12, at 1251 (noting that courts are "engaged in a 
treacherous business indeed when they try to assess the place that religion occupies in a 
person's life"). 
200. Hearings on H.R. 2797, supra note 6, at 130 (letter from Rep. Solarz to Rep. Don 
Edwards (June 22, 1992)). 
